Steege argues that the beginning of the Cold War in post-war
Germany did not take place in a vacuum as it commonly appears. The post-war crisis in Germany, pre-war
German domestic politics, and German identity all influenced the competing
superpowers in unexpected and unexamined ways to set the stage for the division
of both Germany and Berlin. Focusing on
superpower diplomatic wrangling deprives Germans generally, and Berliners
particularly, of agency in determining their own fates. The Black Market of post-war Berlin provides
the analytical lens needed to examine Berliners’ influence on the developing
Cold War conflict between the United States and Soviet Union.
In surviving the material crisis threatening them, Berliners
developed a wide range of strategies to survive, relying on both official
distributions of supplies based on age and employment, but also on illegal and
quasi-legal bartering on the grey and black markets. The official ration levels, which were themselves
rarely met, were too low to allow Berliners to survive indefinitely, requiring
them to find alternate means to fill needs for food, shelter, and other
critical supplies. Travel through the
largely destroyed city was difficult, meaning that Berliners faced long trips
to work sites, to get ration cards, or to foraging locations. Berliners foraging and marketing activities
increasingly frustrated occupation authorities to exert control over the city,
and hampered the Soviet-aligned Socialist Unity Party (SED) from gaining
control over the economy of the surrounding Soviet-zone provinces.
The requirement to fill material needs on the black market
and through foraging had multiple consequences for Berlin and the occupying
authorities. These secondary activities
were a direct cause of Berliners’ absenteeism from their jobs, as they were
forced to choose between cash payments and the availability of foodstuffs in
stores. Foraging and black marketing
interfered with both Soviet and SED efforts to control the economies of both
the Soviet sector of Berlin and the Soviet sectors of occupied Germany as
producers in the surrounding areas smuggled goods to Berlin in exchange for
cash. Currency reform, particularly the
creation of separate west and east marks caused the SED and Soviet authorities to
begin the blockade as a measure to keep the west marks from circulating in the
Soviet zone. Exchange rates between the
two currencies skewed highly toward the west mark, allowing Berliners from the
Western zones of the city higher purchasing power when venturing into the
Soviet zones.
Steege argues that the blockade was never the airtight
cordon of popular conception. The
largest black markets were located in the intersections of the Soviet, English,
and American zones at locations like the Potsdamer Platz, which allowed access
between the zones. The city borders were
crossed frequently by individuals and by vehicles. In many cases vehicles and people passed
without a full search, utilized false compartments, or simply broke through
barricades on the roads. While Berliners
certainly faced privation and Allied aircrews made a heroic effort to supply
the city, both industrial and agricultural products continued to pass into the
Western zones.
Berliners played a positive role in forcing the official division
of the city despite their desire for a unified Berlin and unified Germany. Steege contends that despite the structural
power held by SED functionaries placed in the city government by the Soviet
occupation authority immediately following the occupation, Berliners resisted
their attempts to draw the city wholly into the Soviet sphere by repeatedly
voting for opposition parties in large majorities. In their desire to escape Soviet domination,
and fear that the Western Allies might sacrifice them in order to gain currency
reform and other agreements, Berlin’s anti-Soviet politicians forced the issue
by proposing that the Western sectors rely solely on the new west mark,
refusing to accept or pay salaries using the SED backed east mark. The Western Allies eventual acquiescence in
this currency reform measure forced the division of the city.
The concepts of “between-ness” and “liminality” or “liminal
space” play an important role in Steege’s analysis. Steeg places his history of Berlin in the
grey area between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War,
and argues that this typifies the experiences of Berliners from 1946 –
1950. Similarly, he argues that the Cold
War was an extended temporary period of ambiguity extending from the end of World
War II through the establishment of peace and reunification in 1990. The fluidity of the Cold War phenomenon
typified Berliners existence – they were “betwixt and between” the two
ideological extremes of Communism and Capitalism, war and peace. This idea of “between-ness” or “liminality”
occupies the central role in his analysis.
With this analystical base, Steege interprets events in
post-war Berlin through the lens of the everyday life of regular
Berliners. By looking at history
“inside-out”, Black Market, Cold War
examines the influence ordinary Berliners and Berlin’s political leaders
brought to bear on the beginning of the Cold War. The year 1946 marks the beginning of the
analysis serves to illustrate the development of the Cold War in the tension
between international politics and “Berliner’s material battle to
survive.” This allows Steege to focus on
the agency of Berliners in defining the Cold War and their place in it.
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