Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in
Central Asia.
At
first glance, Peter Hopkirk’s The Great
Game looks like the typically massive tome describing the events or people
of British and Russian competition in Central Asia during the 19th
century. Happily, Hopkirk’s volume goes
above and beyond the rest to not only provide insight into the character of the
men risking their lives in the deserts and passes of Central Asia for King and
Country, but adds almost exhaustive detail regarding the events of the Great
Game and the underlying assumptions that fed both British and Russian paranoia
regarding their Asian frontiers.
Hopkirk
organizes his work chronologically, breaking his chapters into three sections,
each focusing on a different era, providing a discrete beginning, middle, and
end. Although the entire work is
valuable and presents the events and personalities involved clearly and with
much of the additional insight that is absent in other works, the first
section, titled “The Beginnings” may be the most valuable. This is particularly true for those
unfamiliar with the details of the British conquest of India and Russia’s
collective paranoia of invasion from the East after centuries of Mongol
domination, which are both touched on in sufficient detail that the
preoccupation of both sides with security of their borders is understandable.
The
meat of The Great Game begins with
the Mongol conquest and domination of Russia in the 13th century and
the subsequent Russian overthrow of the Golden Horde in the 15th
century. Ivan the Terrible began the
Russian colonization of Asia after defeating Kazan and Astrakhan, when he sent
his people east across Siberia. The
colonization of Siberia was the beginning of the Russian quest for secure
borders bounded by natural defenses, which would bring the conflict with the
British Empire.
The
background Hopkirk provides for the British-Russian conflict in Central Asia
sets it apart from works like Tournament
of Shadows by Meyer and Brysac because unlike them he provides the
explanation for British paranoia regarding the defense of India from Russian
expansion. British paranoia was based on
two factors: The primary factor being India’s economic importance to the
British Empire, which caused it to be considered the “jewel of the
Empire”. The second factor was the long
history of Russian attempts to move into areas that provided potential invasion
routes to British India. The first of
these came in the reign of Peter the Great, who wanted to move his nation onto
an equal economic and social footing with the rest of Europe. After expensive wars with Sweden and Turkey,
he decided to belatedly accept an offer from the Khan of Khiva to become his
vassal, which Peter now saw as an easy way to gain a staging area to move
forces into India to lay claim to the riches flowing to Europe from French and
British possessions. Treachery on the
part of the Khan led to the complete destruction of the 4,000 officers and men
of the Tsar’s delegation. Only Peter the
Great’s preoccupation with his expansion in the Caucasus regions prevented a
punitive expedition back to Khiva.
Hopkirk
details every conceivable Russian stratagem to move into Central Asia with an
eye to occupying India, or at the least fomenting rebellion among its native
populations. Plans were made during the
reign of Catherine the Great to march an army overland through Bokhara and
Kabul to “restore” the Muslim-dominated Mughal Empire and raise the native
subjects of British India in rebellion.
This plan came to naught, although Catherine did expand her domains in
the Caucasus and conquer the Crimea.
A
further early Russian attempt at an Indian invasion appeared under Tsar Paul I,
who dispatched a force of 22,000 Cossacks supported by artillery to invade
India and drive the British out while simultaneously freeing all Russian slaves
in the region. Only Alexander I’s
accession to the throne prevented the invasion from going forward. This expedition would have likely ended in
disaster as it set out in the dead of winter and had only maps to Khiva,
approximately halfway between India and Russia.
The Cossacks also had little information regarding terrain and scant
provisioning for crossing the deserts that lay in their path. It can only be assumed that the disaster
would have been analogous to Napoleon’s invasion of Russia and the destruction
of his Grande Armee. To this point, the British were blissfully
unaware of Russian designs on India, according to Hopkirk.
Hopkirk
attributes the British awakening to the vulnerability of India to Napoleonic
attempts to harass their interests and cut off their communications with the
East by his invasion of Egypt, a key stop for couriers traveling east, rather
than taking the 9-month voyage around Africa.
The Napoleonic threat happened to coincide with British diplomatic
mishandling of their treaty with the Shah of Persia, with whom they had signed
defense and commercial treaties. When
Russia invaded the Persian possession of Armenia, the British refused to assist
Persia against the Russians, saying that the agreement was for an alliance
against France and Afghanistan. Hopkirk
wisely sidesteps any discussion of whether the British acted correctly in the
case, only noting that it would come back to haunt them.
The
Shah’s irritation with the perceived British abrogation of the treaty provided
an opening for a French treaty with Persia that modernized its military,
ostensibly so the Persians could recover their lost territory in Armenia and
Georgia. British perceptions were that
this new army would be used by the French to invade India, which was confirmed
upon the discovery of a Franco-Russian agreement to divide the world between
them, with Russia getting India. If
there had been any doubts regarding Russian interest in British India, this
erased them. In due course, Napoleon
invaded Russia, which ended their joint plans for world domination, and British
diplomats mended ties with Persia, promising to assist in the defense of Persia
against all aggressors, even if they were technically allies of the
British. British advisors arrived to
help with the Persian Army’s modernization and to map out the geographical
approaches through Persia to India.
In
discussing British and Russian (indeed European) interest in exploration and
geography, Hopkirk again separates his work from those like Tournament of Shadows that merely
describe characters and events. Hopkirk
goes beyond this to illustrate the how and why of exploration, while still
focusing on the men performing the tasks.
Although the focus on methods and characters is important and
interesting - The Great Game would be
deadly dull if it were a dry analysis of events and political motives - the true
value is in the discussion of why.
Hopkirk
lays the beginning of anti-Russian sentiment in Great Britain squarely at the
feet of Sir Robert Wilson, who returned from observing the Russian defense
against Napoleon to immediately begin attacking the current vogue of
romanticization of the Russian soldier.
Wilson used his experiences to paint a portrait of Russian and Cossack
atrocities on the battlefield, and to claim that Russia was continuing to build
its army and expand its territory in an effort to accomplish Peter the Great’s
command to conquer the world. Wilson
showed this in pamphlets and books, pointing to Alexander’s acquisition of
200,000 square miles of territory and 13 million subjects, while increasing his
army from 80,000 to 640,000. Hopkirk
supports his claim of Wilson as the original Russophobe by quoting his various
publications and speeches. The material
presented is certainly convincing.
Russia’s subsequent attacks on the possessions of the Shah of Persia
show that, at least in some respects, Wilson was right. The Russian campaign saw numerous atrocities,
including the bayoneting of 4,000 Persians who persisted in their defense of
their stronghold of Lenkoran, located three hundred miles north of Tehran.
Tensions
between Great Britain and Russia ebbed and flowed during the earlier to middle
19th century, including a decade long period of “detente”, including
an uneasy peace. This peaceful period
came to a close with the Crimean War, which Hopkirk describes as a struggle
revolving around issues that did not even involve British interests. As a result of British involvement on the
Turkish side of this dispute that arose from disagreements between the Turks
and Russians over access to the Holy Land for pilgrims. To distract the British, Russian agents
convinced Persia to seize Herat by telling the Shah that the British were no
longer concerned about defending this approach to India and would not be
disturbed. The British response was to
bombard and seize Bushire, in the Persian Gulf, which persuaded the Shah to
relinquish Herat again.
Although
Hopkirk does not make an explicit connection between the Herat episode and
Russian aggressiveness in Central Asian territorial expansion following the
Indian Mutiny, it is obvious from the structure of his text that they are part
of a related trend. Part of the Russian
advance involved the same types of exploration and intrigue that the British
used. In the Russian case, a Colonel
Ignatiev, who visited Khiva to open its markets to Russian trade and gather
intelligence, led it. Ignatiev followed
this visit by negotiating in Bokhara for the release of Russian slaves, trade
access, and to avoid diplomatic contact with the British. The Russians followed their intelligence
gathering with conquests in Khokand, Khiva, and Bokhara. Hopkirk claims that this activity had three
goals: to further extend Russia’s borders and buffer areas, to open Central
Asia to Russian trade in the hope of significant economic stimulus for the
Russian economy, and to destabilize the British rule in India.
The Great Game focuses on the continuing intrigue between
Great Britain and Russia, especially the use of exploration and geographical
societies to gather the intelligence of unknown lands for the defense of India,
or its assault, depending on the point of view.
It is unnecessary to detail all of those adventures here, but it is
important to acknowledge that in addition to the exploration of the passes from
Afghanistan, Tibet, and Persia, Hopkirk includes the exploration of Chinese
Turkestan in his narrative. Particularly
important is the sudden British realization that the passes of the Khyber were
unnecessary for a successful invasion force.
Hopkirk
concludes by questioning whether British concerns over a Russian invasion of
India from the north were reasonable given the massive natural obstacles that
lay in the way of such an undertaking.
He recognizes, though that this perspective is derived with the benefit of
hindsight by modern historians, and acknowledges that to the actors it was an
absolute possibility that required preparation of defenses. Hopkirk’s work covers much the same territory
as other volumes on the “Great Game”, but unlike them he combines an accessible
narrative with the full scope of the conflict.
So, in addition to an easy read, the student receives all of the
pertinent information regarding the conflict in Central Asia from the motives
of both Russia and Great Britain, to the exploits of Vitkevich, Stoddart,
Moorcroft, and Ignatiev, and the domestic political issues provided by the
proponents of forward policy or masterful inactivity. Hopkirk’s is certainly the most complete
treatment of the subject available.
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