Zubok and Pleshakov have multiple goals for Inside the
Kremlin’s Cold War, including the use of newly opened Soviet and Chinese
archives to achieve a new understanding of the driving factors in the early
Cold War from the Soviet perspective.
Other authors have attempted to produce similar works, notably Gaddis in
We Now Know. However, Inside
the Kremlin’s Cold War takes a different tack, made possible by the fact
that the authors were educated under the Soviet system, being born in Moscow
and Yalta during the 1950s. Their unique
background allows Zubok and Pleshakov to approach the topic of Soviet Cold War
leadership with an understanding of Russian history, values and goals that is
not possible for a non-Russian. Zubok
and Pleshakov’s Russian background also makes for some challenges in
translating documents feelings and shared understanding to the American
audience, especially as they intended Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War for
a broad American audience, not just academics.
All of this combines to lead to the conclusion that three main factors
created the Kremlin’s view of the Cold War: the personalities of Soviet
leaders, the ideological and geopolitical motives of those leaders, and the
policies of the United States.
Inside the Cold War is organized in chapters devoted
to an individual leader or set of leaders that had a significant impact on the
Soviet approach to the Cold War. Because
Zubok and Pleshakov present the leaders in the order of their ascent to power,
this arrangement has an almost pseudo-chronological effect as well, although
some of the events in the different chapters may overlap to some extent. With the traditional stance that the Cold War
began approximately at the end of World War II, Inside the Cold War
begins with Stalin.
In their discussion of Stalin, Zubok and Pleshakov take the
stance that, in addition to the frequently cited paranoia and
self-identification with the State, Stalin acted within a complex Russian
national messianic complex that was inherited from the Tsarist period. This argument can be summed in this
manner: from the 15th century
the Tsars, and by extension the Russian people, had seen themselves as the
guardians of Christianity with the Russian Empire a third Roman Empire. As
such, it was the duty of Russians to expand the Empire to save mankind. The idea of Russia as the savior of mankind
was further enhanced by the view that Russians had protected the West from the
Mongol Hordes, had stopped Napoleon from conquering Europe in the 19th
century, and then Hitler in the 20th century. Zubok and Pleshakov further argue that Soviet
leaders, particularly after Lenin, combined the traditional Russian ideal that
the Russian Empire had the mission to save the world from a “militant
anti-Christ” with the universalist doctrine of Marxism to form a
revolutionary-imperial doctrine that informed their decision-making. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War claims
that Stalin internalized this Russian national messianic ideal, and that it
drove his expansion in Eastern Europe and support for nationalist movements in
colonial areas such as Southeast Asia.
Although Zubok and Pleshakov continue to make the case that
Stalin truly hoped for post-war cooperation between the “Big Three”, and
therefore, waited before making truly expansionist moves and supporting
revolutionary movements at the end of the war, the death of FDR and the
election loss by Churchill unsettled him, as he was used to dealing with small
numbers of equals. This awakened his
inherent paranoia: he did not consider either Truman or Atlee to be his equals
and did not trust their motives. The
atomic bomb used on Hiroshima heightened his sense of insecurity, particularly
toward American intentions in Japan.
According to Zubok and Pleshakov, Stalin worried that a quick Japanese
surrender would deprive the Soviet Union of the defensive perimeter of Outer
Mongolia, Manchuria, and North Korea he wanted in the Far East. Atomic bombs combined with American and
British air power could also be used to attack critical targets within Russia
proper, which upset his vision of the supremacy of the Red Army against the two
sea powers. The atomic bomb caused
Stalin to push for his East European security zone with more vigor, as it would
provide additional attack warning and anti-aircraft defenses for American
attacks to negotiate. It also caused him
to place much more emphasis on the Soviet Union’s atomic weapons program, which
made excellent use of intelligence information acquired from agents in the
United States.
The result of Stalin’s change of heart regarding
international cooperation caused him to return to his conception of a
revolutionary-imperial power. Where the
Soviet Union had refrained from supporting Greek, Macedonian, and Vietnamese
revolutionaries immediately after World War II, after the use of the atomic
bomb, he lent aid to the Chinese fighting Chiang Kai-shek and to Kim Il Sung in
North Korea, ultimately giving North Korea the weapons, training, and approval
for their attack on South Korea.
Zubok and Pleshakov, then move to a discussion of the roles
of Molotov and Zhdanov in the creation of the Eastern Bloc and development of a
clear revolutionary-imperial ideology.
Both of these discussions are important, but more interesting is the
analysis of the potentially radical change in the Cold War environment provided
by Beria and Malenkov, who attempted to split control over the Soviet Union’s
foreign policy between themselves upon Stalin’s death. These two men, according to Zubok and
Pleshakov, are responsible for sudden changes in Soviet foreign policy upon the
death of Stalin. Beria controlled the
NKVD and the Soviet Atomic bomb production projects, and was driven primarily
by the accrual of power. He used terror and coercion as motivators. Malenkov,
in contrast, was a capable administrator who was not driven by dogma or a
search for power, but pragmatism. These
two men were the ones chosen by Stalin for his secret tasks and projects such
as restructuring military and intelligence organizations, atomic weapons
projects, and missile technology development.
At first, it appears that Beria and Malenkov worked subtly
within the Presidium, asking pointed foreign policy questions and requesting
that issues be revisited. The issues
included peace in Korea, policy toward Germany, Iran, Turkey, and Austria, as
well as internal changes like amnesty to a million prisoners in the Gulag. Beria supported a united and neutral Germany
whether it was socialist, or not, and called for the disbanding of collective
farms and the cessation of policies discouraging capitalism in general. Beria supported these ideas on the theory
that Germany was the entire source of the Cold War conflict between the United
States and Soviet Union. He shared this
view with Malenkov, but the rest of the Presidium did not agree.
Beria and Malenkov lost the struggle for power when
Khrushchev, who had maintained control of most of the Soviet Union’s domestic
policy, suddenly sided with Molotov to denounce Beria’s policies as
anti-Soviet. Malenkov was eased out of
his position after he declared in speeches that warned that thermonuclear
weapons could destroy world civilization.
According to Zubok and Pleshakov, this flew in the face of the Soviet
revolutionary-imperial theory motivating the Politburo, and as a result
Malenkov was ultimately removed from the Central Committee and sent into
exile. Khrushchev continued to reform
Soviet foreign policy, but with a different goal than Beria and Malenkov, who
had sought peace with the West.
Khrushchev’s reform of Soviet policy sought to mend fences
with other Socialist countries by addressing their grievances against the
high-handed policies of Stalin. To
promote amity with China, Yugoslavia and others, Khrushchev discarded Soviet
military bases and economic concessions with those countries and sought to show
that Soviet foreign policy was aimed at promoting the spread of Socialism, not
merely enhancing Soviet status. Khrushchev used the new military capabilities
of the Soviet Union, including ballistic missiles and hydrogen bombs to promote
his interpretation of the revolutionary-imperial paradigm.
According to Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War,
Khrushchev’s personality and foreign policy seem full of contradictions. While fully embracing Stalin’s revolutionary-imperial
doctrine, the basis for Soviet demands in Eastern Europe, and placing the blame
for the Cold War on Western leaders, particularly Truman and Churchill, he
spent political capital denouncing Stalin’s crimes and seeking peace with the United
States. By seeking peace with the United
States, despite his feeling that the Soviet Union had been poorly treated at
the end of World War II, he cost the Soviet Union its most valuable ally:
China.
Additional contradictions appear in other aspects of
Khrushchev’s foreign policy, particularly in his efforts to promote Communist
revolutions around the world while attempting to pursue détente with the
West. Zubok and Pleshakov point out that
he failed to see the contradiction in this dichotomy, and blame the dual nature
of Khrushchev’s foreign policy goals for the increased tensions of his reign
between 1954-1964. Khrushchev’s almost
schizophrenic nature is again illustrated by the claim that at the same time he
recognized the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and missile systems, he ordered
his air defense forces to shoot down any unidentified aircraft in Soviet
airspace. While claiming that he knew
how close to the brink he could push the United States after Dulles’
announcement of the “massive retaliation” policy, he ordered nuclear missiles
placed in Cuba to threaten the United States’ mainland. A final part of Khrushchev’s foreign policy
strategy was the belief that the nuclear deadlock between the United States and
Soviet Union made it possible to support revolutionary movements around the
world at no real risk to the Soviet Union itself. This belief would drag the Soviets into
military interventions in Afghanistan. Angola, and the Horn of Africa.
Zubok and Pleshakov continue to discuss the Sino-Soviet
schism and difficulties in Germany, including the erection of the Berlin Wall,
before turning to relations between Khrushchev and Kennedy. The illustration of the Kennedy-Khrushchev
summit meeting in Vienna is a good illustration of opportunities lost because
Khrushchev was operating on assumptions that the American President could not
understand and that Khrushchev underestimated the resolve of Kennedy and the
relative balance of nuclear power between the two nations. It is particularly interesting that
Khrushchev took Kennedy’s endeavors to seek a more prudent type of diplomacy
between the two nuclear powers as a sign of weakness, and dismissed Kennedy as
not having the depth or stature of Eisenhower. Khrushchev’s underestimation of
Kennedy led directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
With Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, Zubok and
Pleshakov have provided a valuable and insightful look at the inner workings of
the Soviet leadership and how those leaders affected Soviet-American relations
in the post-war period. They do this
using methods that are unique to their work.
First, the utilize newly available Soviet and Chinese archives and apply
their understanding of Russian history and cultural identity to “read between
the lines” to draw deeper meaning from documents such as secret and coded
communications that they claim rely on the Soviet mentality to convey their
true and fullest meaning. This has the
potential of adding a much greater understanding of what those documents
actually refer to. However, there is
also the danger that Zubok and Pleshakov may read in detail that simply does
not exist in these documents. Not being
able to read the mind of a Molotov or a Beria means that they must rely on
their memories of what it was like to live under the Soviet system to fill in
gaps. This is particularly true of an
individual such as Stalin who they maintain opened up only to his second wife,
who committed suicide in 1937. With no
letters or diaries discussing the thoughts or what Zubok and Pleshakov portray
as an almost introverted and intensely private man is fraught with
dangers. The main danger, of course, is
that Zubok and Pleshakov read into the evidence they do have from other sources
what they wish to see there.
Another weakness is that although American policies and acts
are mentioned in some places, it is quite sporadic. It makes it difficult to assess how some of
the policies or perceived policies of the West impacted Soviet thinking. Although some like brinksmanship, which is
assigned solely to the Eisenhower Administration, is mentioned, as is the
policy of “massive retaliation”, little mention is made of the policies of
Truman at the start of the Cold War.
Similarly, no mention is made whether the implicit exclusion of South
Korea from the American defensive perimeter had any impact on Stalin’s decision
to support Kim Il Sung’s request to invade the South. American authors frequently cite the South
Korean exclusion in at least one speech as a key event in the decision for
North Korea to attack, as it implied that the United States would not
intervene.
That said, the insight into the psychology of the Soviet
Union’s leaders is quite valuable, especially after it is put into the context
of Russian history and the ideological perspective dominant among those
leaders. The idea of the doctrine of
revolutionary-imperialism that takes an pre-existing Russian messianic mind-set
and melds it with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that world revolution is
inevitable is particularly instructive when applied to the expansionist
policies of Stalin and the support for nationalist-communist insurgencies in
the third world by both Stalin and Khrushchev.
Although it is not stated in Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, this
philosophy was bound to run up against the American universalist ideal of
democratic and capitalist systems everywhere.
Finally, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War is a valuable
resource for understanding the development of the early Cold War Era,
especially when combined with works that focus on the Western perspective
because it deals with those unfathomable questions that Western-oriented texts
cannot deal with, the most nagging being “What drove Stalin, Molotov, and
Khrushchev to make the decisions they made and act in the manner they
did.” Zubok and Pleshakov’s work is also
eminently readable for either an academic or non-academic audience, and should
be accessible to the authors’ stated target audience: the American reading
public. In this it is assisted by not
apologizing for the acts of Stalin or others, calling them criminal or misinformed
when appropriate. Despite a few
problems, Zubok and Pleshakov achieve their goal of providing the reader with a
greater understanding of the other side of the Cold War.
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