The siege of the French airhead at Dien Bien Phu from
November 1953 until May 1954 was the decisive battle of the First Indochina
War. The French defeat by the Vietminh
radically shifted the balance of power at the Geneva Conference of 1954 toward
Ho Chi Minh and forced France to withdraw from Southeast Asia as a defeated
colonial power. Fall argues that
France’s failures at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference were not inevitable,
but the result of tactical and strategic mistakes. The Vietminh, led by General Vo Nguyen Giap,
surprised French military planners by locating large amounts of artillery in
the rugged hills surrounding Dien Bien Phu, and obtain adequate stocks of ammunition
from China after the end of the Korean War.
At the same time, France overestimated both its ability to airdrop
supplies to the garrison, and the willingness of the United States to come to
its aid. The result was that by the end
of the siege, survivors described the muddy outpost as “hell in a very small
place.”
Located in a river valley in northwest Vietnam, Dien Bien
Phu occupied a strategic location in the Vietminh’s rear area. In addition to
blocking an important route into Laos and depriving the Vietminh of rice supplies,
French Generals Navarre and Cogny expected the garrison to conduct mobile
operations against the Vietminh. They
hoped that the fortress would divert a large number of Vietminh troops from
their operations in the Red River Valley, enhancing security in the critical
areas of Hanoi and Haiphong. Like the
earlier airheads at Nau San and Chai Lau, Dien Bien Phu relied solely on aerial
resupply.
The French plan went awry almost immediately when the
paratroops met stiff resistance on landing at Dien Phu. Instead of a lightly defended remote valley,
French troops found a large number of Vietminh conducting exercises as they
recuperated from combat. The Vietminh
316th Division was also operating nearby, with its infantry and
artillery battalions laying siege to the fortress almost as soon as French
troops arrived. The close proximity of
the enemy forced a change in the nature of the garrison, which had to construct
permanent fortifications. The Vietminh’s
unexpected ability to transport and supply artillery in the rugged terrain
surrounding Dien Bien Phu increased the need for extensive fortifications. Unfortunately for the French, the valley did
not contain sufficient lumber to construct bunkers capable of withstanding
heavy artillery, and the available air transports did not have the capacity to
quickly deliver the 30,000 tons of construction materials required.
As the siege continued, French miscalculations took a deadly
toll. France was unable properly supply
the garrison due to the accuracy of Vietminh anti-aircraft fire, reducing the
amount of munitions and spare parts available.
Accurate and heavy artillery fire closed Dien Bien Phu’s runway to
incoming aircraft eliminating evacuation of wounded and reducing the
replenishment of troops. France’s miscalculation
was on the willingness of the United States to provide direct air support to
relieve the siege. Senate Minority
Leader Lyndon Johnson halted American plans to relieve the siege using heavy
B-29 by insisting that Great Britain also join the effort. Not have heavy bombers or airlift capability
of its own doomed the garrison at Dien Bien Phu and France’s reoccupation of
Vietnam.
Killed in 1967 while covering the war in South Vietnam, Fall
writes from the perspective of his era.
From his perspective, the war appears only as a conflict between
Communist ideologues and the democratic West.
Writing during the 1960’s also forced Fall to rely exclusively on
sources outside of North Vietnam, although he did contact North African
survivors of the siege after Algerian independence from France. This prevents Hell in a Very Small Place from examining the entire siege,
although Fall attempts to provide balance by including comments of captured
Vietminh troops on the low morale, high casualties, and poor supply position of
Giap’s forces.
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