Posted by Chris at 9/7/2008 4:50 PM ...
During our discussion of Playing Cards in Cairo, Tim, Grandmasta and I pondered whether Cairenes (or other Egyptians) really interacted with American pop culture in the way Hugh Miles indicated. Grandmasta argues that only upper class Egyptians would have the kind of contact with American media to identify Oprah or other celebrities. I can't disagree, as he and Tim are the ones with actual experience of Egypt, and it also makes sense. How many poor people will have access to satellite television, or be interested in American shows?
Still, people in other nations are familiar with American pop culture in ways we are not with theirs. This applies to both industrial and developing nations. We still don't have an explanation for why, other than parochialism of ourselves and our media. Tim's example was of Umm Kulthoum, an Egyptian star of the 1950's and 1960's. One source claims she was the most popular musician of the last century in the Middle East, but I had not heard of her until Tim mentioned it. I might have heard her name before, but if I did, I certainly don't remember it. Still, you would think that at least educated Americans would know her name.
I imagine that these days the only way for a celebrity from the Middle East to penetrate the awareness of modern Americans is to appear in an Hollywood film, or to die tragically in a scandal involving an important politician, as did Lebanese star Suzanne Tamim, who was recently murdered in Dubai. Despite the location of the article on CNN.com, I imagine most people in the United States skimmed right over it. In fact, I probably only clicked the link due to my conversation Tim about just this issue.
Why care? Mostly this is a symptom of Americans' isolation from the rest of the world, similar to, but less problematic than, not learning a foreign language. Being more familiar with the pop culture of other nations can only help us understand them better, which to me would reduce the fear of the unknown most people get when they encounter folks from distant places, or when those places pop up on the news. And, no, anime, manga, and Iron Chef, don't count.
Historicus - Military History, books, and teaching
Showing posts with label Archive. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Archive. Show all posts
Saturday, December 8, 2012
Excuse Me?
Posted by Chris at 4/21/2008 7:21 PM
Counter-insurgency operations require more intelligent, more mature, more stable troops to implement. Every misstep by the so-called "strategic corporals" lengthens the conflict and reduces the likelihood of success. So why does a force that is slowly gaining expertise in COIN operations recruit "convicted sex offenders, people convicted of making terrorist threats and child abusers"?
Keep in mind that the U.S. military in Iraq is just now rescuing its reputation from the effects of Abu Ghraib, the Haditha massacre, and excesses by private military contractors? This is a force that continues to have issues with sexual assault against its own personnel. So some idiot decides that its a good idea to bring in the folks that already have problems with violent crime into the force engaged in such sensitive operations. According to The Guardian, last year 511 recruits with felony convictions were recruited, following the 2006 total of 249.
The recruits included:
Counter-insurgency operations require more intelligent, more mature, more stable troops to implement. Every misstep by the so-called "strategic corporals" lengthens the conflict and reduces the likelihood of success. So why does a force that is slowly gaining expertise in COIN operations recruit "convicted sex offenders, people convicted of making terrorist threats and child abusers"?
Keep in mind that the U.S. military in Iraq is just now rescuing its reputation from the effects of Abu Ghraib, the Haditha massacre, and excesses by private military contractors? This is a force that continues to have issues with sexual assault against its own personnel. So some idiot decides that its a good idea to bring in the folks that already have problems with violent crime into the force engaged in such sensitive operations. According to The Guardian, last year 511 recruits with felony convictions were recruited, following the 2006 total of 249.
The recruits included:
The felons accepted into the army and marines included 87 soldiers convicted of assault or maiming, 130 convicted of non-marijuana drug offences, seven convicted of making terrorist threats, and two convicted of indecent behaviour with a child. Waivers were also granted to 500 burglars and thieves, 19 arsonists and 9 sex offendersThese individuals come from a greater pool of almost 35,000 enlisted recruits that received moral waivers in 2006. Interestingly, the Air Force and Navy are allowed to recruit people with multiple felony convictions, while the limit for the Army and Marine Corps is a single felony. I remember back in the 1980's it was harder to get into the Air Force or Navy than the Army, I guess that's no longer the case.
Fighting Insurgency
Posted by Chris at 9/7/2007 2:48 PM ...
Local Iraqi Sunni insurgents are beginning to fight back against al-Qaeda in Iraq, realizing that they bring more problems than they are worth. This is exactly the type of thing that you want to see when fighting an insurgency, but exploiting it will be difficult or impossible - U.S. interference could easily reunite the two groups against their common enemy. Douglas Farah writes that it might be possible for the United States to use Iraqi animosity toward al-Qaeda to broker a cease fire, with the goal of stabilizing Iraq and getting out. If the British weren't so keen on reducing their forces in Iraq, I would say that they had a better chance of acting as peacemaker due to their greater historical experience (and success) with insurgencies. They certainly not damaged their reputations as much in Iraq as our forces have, so it might be easier for them to act as a go-between.
Information Wafare
This part of fighting insurgency is something that the United States does not do well. Not ony does it require boosting the American public image around the world, but it means finding a way to counter Islamist terrorist propaganda operations in traditional and new media. As this post at MountainRunner illustrates, this is an area in which the United States is sadly failing. The criticality of the need to develop effective Information Warfare capabilities is further highlighted by Daveed Garstein-Ross' Counterterrorism Blog post about the new and more sophisticated face of Islamist terrorist leadership, which not only has military and theological credentials, but is conscious of the negative impact on its support when atrocities are committed and the need to foster economic and civil development in Islamic states run under Shari'a law.
Information Warfare is also about controlling the communications environment, not allowing the enemy to do so. One good example of how this works is in U.S. politics. The GOP has learned how to control the dialog by defining the terms used in the political landscape, to the Democrats dismay. This gives them a decided advantage at election time - Republicans have defined liberal as "bad", putting Dems at the disadvantage from the start. In the fight against Islamist insurgencies, we face the same problem. As long as Al-Qaeda and company define the terms - making terrorists into jihadis - the United States and its allies are losing the propaganda war.
To counteract this problem, counter-terror expert David Kilcullen is calling for a "New Lexicon" for describing the actions of al-Qaeda and other Islamists. Some examples, courtesy of Small Wars Journal:
"Soft" Resources
A recent DoD report seems to say that fighting against the insurgents in a traditional military campaign should not be our preferred strategy - getting out quickly and leaving a more stable environment should be. This falls inline with the guidance in John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife and Sir Robert Thompson's five rules for fighting insurgencies - killing people is sometimes counterproductive, particularly when the wrong people get killed. This was also a major theme of Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, which devotes a significant portion of the text to the negative impact of free fire zones, indiscriminate shelling, and bombing campaigns. Every dead civilian helps the enemy when fighting an insurgency.
That's why today's Danger Room discussion on the use of Anthropologists and other Social Scientists in battling the insurgency in Iraq is so important. Rather than being more violent or more muscular in the prosecution of the war, a smarter, culturally aware approach might be the key to victory (or even a non-loss). Why? Because we don't uselessly antagonize the people we are trying to protect. We learn what types of assistance we can provide to them. We learn how to convince people that we are on their side, and that our goal is peace and prosperity. It also might help us exploit fissues among insurgent groups like the one mentioned above.
Local Iraqi Sunni insurgents are beginning to fight back against al-Qaeda in Iraq, realizing that they bring more problems than they are worth. This is exactly the type of thing that you want to see when fighting an insurgency, but exploiting it will be difficult or impossible - U.S. interference could easily reunite the two groups against their common enemy. Douglas Farah writes that it might be possible for the United States to use Iraqi animosity toward al-Qaeda to broker a cease fire, with the goal of stabilizing Iraq and getting out. If the British weren't so keen on reducing their forces in Iraq, I would say that they had a better chance of acting as peacemaker due to their greater historical experience (and success) with insurgencies. They certainly not damaged their reputations as much in Iraq as our forces have, so it might be easier for them to act as a go-between.
Information Wafare
This part of fighting insurgency is something that the United States does not do well. Not ony does it require boosting the American public image around the world, but it means finding a way to counter Islamist terrorist propaganda operations in traditional and new media. As this post at MountainRunner illustrates, this is an area in which the United States is sadly failing. The criticality of the need to develop effective Information Warfare capabilities is further highlighted by Daveed Garstein-Ross' Counterterrorism Blog post about the new and more sophisticated face of Islamist terrorist leadership, which not only has military and theological credentials, but is conscious of the negative impact on its support when atrocities are committed and the need to foster economic and civil development in Islamic states run under Shari'a law.
Information Warfare is also about controlling the communications environment, not allowing the enemy to do so. One good example of how this works is in U.S. politics. The GOP has learned how to control the dialog by defining the terms used in the political landscape, to the Democrats dismay. This gives them a decided advantage at election time - Republicans have defined liberal as "bad", putting Dems at the disadvantage from the start. In the fight against Islamist insurgencies, we face the same problem. As long as Al-Qaeda and company define the terms - making terrorists into jihadis - the United States and its allies are losing the propaganda war.
To counteract this problem, counter-terror expert David Kilcullen is calling for a "New Lexicon" for describing the actions of al-Qaeda and other Islamists. Some examples, courtesy of Small Wars Journal:
irhab (eer-HAB — Arabic for terrorism, thus enabling us to call the al Qaeda-style killers irhabis, irhabists and irhabiyoun rather than the so-called "jihadis" and "jihadists" and "mujahideen" and "shahids" (martyrs) they badly want to be called. (Author's lament: Here we are, almost six years into a life-and-death War on Terrorism, and most of us do not even know this basic Arabic for terrorism.)
Hirabah (hee-RAH-bah) — Unholy War and forbidden "war against society" or what we would today call crimes against humanity. Among the many al Qaeda-style crimes and sins which constitute this most "unholy war" are such willful, and unrepented transgressions as those enumerated in the next section of this proposed glossary of terms.
mufsiduun (moof-see-DOON) — Islam's word for evildoers, sinners and corrupters whose criminality and sinfulness, unless ended and sincerely repented, will incur Allah’s ultimate condemnation on Judgment Day; Islam's optimum antonym for "mujahiddin."
munafiquun (moon-ah-fee-KOON) — hypocrites to Islam who pretend to be faithful to the Qur'an but who willfully violate many of its basic rules, mandates and prohibitions.
Jahannam (jyah-HAH-nahm) – Islam’s antonym for Paradise and meaning the Eternal Hellfire to which Allah on Judgment Day condemns unrepentant, unforgiven evildoers and hypocrites of the unholy war variety.
khawarij (kha-WAH-reej) — outside-the-religion and outside-the-community individuals and activities; derived from the ancient al Qaeda-like militant Khawar or Kharajite sect, eventually suppressed and expelled as apostates and enemies of authentic, Qur'anic Islam.
Of course, what is also needed is a way to renounce Sayyab Qutb's interpretation of jihad as a valid offensive tool against opponents, and the identification of Christians and Jews and infidels or unbelievers. A further issue to deal with is the belief among Islamist terrorists that the mass war doctrines, as deployed during World War II, that do not distinguish civilian from military targets allow guilt-free targeting of women and children.Hirabah (hee-RAH-bah) — Unholy War and forbidden "war against society" or what we would today call crimes against humanity. Among the many al Qaeda-style crimes and sins which constitute this most "unholy war" are such willful, and unrepented transgressions as those enumerated in the next section of this proposed glossary of terms.
mufsiduun (moof-see-DOON) — Islam's word for evildoers, sinners and corrupters whose criminality and sinfulness, unless ended and sincerely repented, will incur Allah’s ultimate condemnation on Judgment Day; Islam's optimum antonym for "mujahiddin."
munafiquun (moon-ah-fee-KOON) — hypocrites to Islam who pretend to be faithful to the Qur'an but who willfully violate many of its basic rules, mandates and prohibitions.
Jahannam (jyah-HAH-nahm) – Islam’s antonym for Paradise and meaning the Eternal Hellfire to which Allah on Judgment Day condemns unrepentant, unforgiven evildoers and hypocrites of the unholy war variety.
khawarij (kha-WAH-reej) — outside-the-religion and outside-the-community individuals and activities; derived from the ancient al Qaeda-like militant Khawar or Kharajite sect, eventually suppressed and expelled as apostates and enemies of authentic, Qur'anic Islam.
"Soft" Resources
A recent DoD report seems to say that fighting against the insurgents in a traditional military campaign should not be our preferred strategy - getting out quickly and leaving a more stable environment should be. This falls inline with the guidance in John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife and Sir Robert Thompson's five rules for fighting insurgencies - killing people is sometimes counterproductive, particularly when the wrong people get killed. This was also a major theme of Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, which devotes a significant portion of the text to the negative impact of free fire zones, indiscriminate shelling, and bombing campaigns. Every dead civilian helps the enemy when fighting an insurgency.
That's why today's Danger Room discussion on the use of Anthropologists and other Social Scientists in battling the insurgency in Iraq is so important. Rather than being more violent or more muscular in the prosecution of the war, a smarter, culturally aware approach might be the key to victory (or even a non-loss). Why? Because we don't uselessly antagonize the people we are trying to protect. We learn what types of assistance we can provide to them. We learn how to convince people that we are on their side, and that our goal is peace and prosperity. It also might help us exploit fissues among insurgent groups like the one mentioned above.
Banned Books Week
Posted by Chris at 9/13/2006 9:55 AM...
Banned Books Week
This week is our annual celebration of censorship in America, an event primarily promoted by the American Library Association, which posts annual lists of the most frequently challenged or banned books in the United States. You wouldn't think this an issue on our great land, with Freedom of Speech embedded into our core governing documents, and a founding myth of self-governance, personal responsibility, and the need of an educated populace to make our Republic work.
Censorship has a long and disturbing history in the United States, albeit not to the extremes witnessed in other places. Government censorship in the United States is also not a new phenomenon: it didn't arrive with Joseph McCarthy, William Tecumseh Sherman, Woodrow Wilson, the Vietnam War, Desert Storm, or any other recent event. Censorship arrived with the Founding Fathers: check out events during the Quasi War with France, or the lead-up to the War of 1812 for examples.
Censorship and manipulation of the press by the military and other governmental bodies during war is a particular research interest of mine, so I tend to focus on those types of events, but censorship exists at many other levels in our society. Usually, this takes the form of community activists challenging books in the name of "protecting" the values and morals of children or their community from the content of certain books. These days, items that are politically controversial are frequent targets: like EPA archives, government studies of global warming, or old estimates of U.S. inventories of ICBMS.
As part of Banned Book Week, Google is providing access to a significant portion of the most banned books. Scrolling through the list, it is quite interesting how many of them I was assigned to read in High School: Brave New World, Catch-22, Heart of Darkness, Slaughterhouse Five, The Diary of Anne Frank, Huckleberry Finn, A Separate Peace, The Jungle, A Clockwork Orange, 1984, The Catcher in the Rye, The Great Gatsby, and The Lord of the Flies. I'm wondering why some places see these works as items to assign their students, while others are desperately trying to keep their young people away from them. The same goes for most of the Judy Bloom books that frequently appear on the list, Madeline L'Engle's Wrinkle in Time, or the Harry Potter series.
Banned Books Week
This week is our annual celebration of censorship in America, an event primarily promoted by the American Library Association, which posts annual lists of the most frequently challenged or banned books in the United States. You wouldn't think this an issue on our great land, with Freedom of Speech embedded into our core governing documents, and a founding myth of self-governance, personal responsibility, and the need of an educated populace to make our Republic work.
Censorship has a long and disturbing history in the United States, albeit not to the extremes witnessed in other places. Government censorship in the United States is also not a new phenomenon: it didn't arrive with Joseph McCarthy, William Tecumseh Sherman, Woodrow Wilson, the Vietnam War, Desert Storm, or any other recent event. Censorship arrived with the Founding Fathers: check out events during the Quasi War with France, or the lead-up to the War of 1812 for examples.
Censorship and manipulation of the press by the military and other governmental bodies during war is a particular research interest of mine, so I tend to focus on those types of events, but censorship exists at many other levels in our society. Usually, this takes the form of community activists challenging books in the name of "protecting" the values and morals of children or their community from the content of certain books. These days, items that are politically controversial are frequent targets: like EPA archives, government studies of global warming, or old estimates of U.S. inventories of ICBMS.
As part of Banned Book Week, Google is providing access to a significant portion of the most banned books. Scrolling through the list, it is quite interesting how many of them I was assigned to read in High School: Brave New World, Catch-22, Heart of Darkness, Slaughterhouse Five, The Diary of Anne Frank, Huckleberry Finn, A Separate Peace, The Jungle, A Clockwork Orange, 1984, The Catcher in the Rye, The Great Gatsby, and The Lord of the Flies. I'm wondering why some places see these works as items to assign their students, while others are desperately trying to keep their young people away from them. The same goes for most of the Judy Bloom books that frequently appear on the list, Madeline L'Engle's Wrinkle in Time, or the Harry Potter series.
Sunday, July 25, 2010
The American Airpower Mess
Posted by Chris at 3/22/2009 12:00 PM ...
Last week David Axe reported that the U.S. Navy finally did something that USAF needed to do years ago - leased four Super Tocano light attack planes to support Special Operations. The Super Tocanos can't operate off carriers, but at least the Navy understand that flexible air to ground capability is a must in the modern threat environment. This fits with the normal Navy and Marine Corps approach to aviation - it's a necessary tool used to address multiple problems. To be effective you need multiple types of aircraft, not just super expensive fighters and bombers. This is why the Navy is getting the P-8, the EA-18G, and the F-35 on top of their other airframes, at a a time USAF is focused on the F-22 and F-35 to the exclusion of almost everything else, even the necessary support aircraft like tankers.
Last week David Axe reported that the U.S. Navy finally did something that USAF needed to do years ago - leased four Super Tocano light attack planes to support Special Operations. The Super Tocanos can't operate off carriers, but at least the Navy understand that flexible air to ground capability is a must in the modern threat environment. This fits with the normal Navy and Marine Corps approach to aviation - it's a necessary tool used to address multiple problems. To be effective you need multiple types of aircraft, not just super expensive fighters and bombers. This is why the Navy is getting the P-8, the EA-18G, and the F-35 on top of their other airframes, at a a time USAF is focused on the F-22 and F-35 to the exclusion of almost everything else, even the necessary support aircraft like tankers.
The Tocanos are designed for close air support, a role USAF always seems to want to get rid of in favor of the more glamorous air superiority and strategic bombing roles (still not shown effective in any war). Before Operation Desert Storm (and even afterward), USAF wanted to scrap the most effect aircraft of the 21st century battlefield - the A-10 Thunderbolt II (Warthog). While the A-10 is getting a much needed upgrade program, the Air Force seems to think that armed drones firing missiles is the way to handle close air support and reconnaissance. The two dirty little secrets here is that use of drones to attack insurgents invariably seem to kill innocent civilians or violate borders, simultaneously recruiting more insurgents and antagonizing the populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that more than 30% of the $4.5 million drones crashed. That means that while they can hit targets, they are counterproductive and not as cheap as claimed.
Capt. Mark Mullins, the naval officer running the program seems to understand the issues:
"It's not about flying in from 1,000 miles away, dropping some thousand-pound bombs and leaving. It's about working with [the ground force], doing the intelligence preparation of the battlespace, doing a [communication] relay, close air support, eyes on target and if there's squirters leaving the target, keeping up with them and tracking them down and doing [bomb damage assessment] at the end."Mullins was careful to say that the Navy is working with the Air Force and Marine Corps on the new program to test the Tocanos for combat use, but the message is clear. The Air Force dropped the ball on close air support, and continues to do so. While I won't dispute the need to procure advanced weapons to face future threats, or the need to proceed rationally in developing and deploying new (to us) weapon systems, the fact of the matter is that USAF doesn't want this role, and is as slow to address it as it was to deal with the reality of tactical air combat in the 1950s and 1960s (see Korea and Vietnam) when it wanted to focus on supersonic fighters armed with missiles designed to attack bombers.
If, as Jimmy Wu reported in 2006, the Key West agreement is truly dead, maybe the Air Force should relinquish its hold on close air support and tactical transport so that the services that rely on those aspects of airpower (Army/Marines) can get on with business. Give the Army and Marines the A-10s and allow them to deploy more of their own fixed wing assets to handle counterinsurgency and close air support, and be done with it.
Using Paula Loyd as a Weapon in Debate
Posted by Chris at 1/10/2009 10:55 AM ...
Paula Loyd's death as a result of burns sustained when serving as a member of a Human Terrain Team in Afghanistan is creating a virtual firestorm of reaction from both the left and right of the political spectrum. The comment threads at Michael Yon's website, and at Wired's Danger Room show some disturbing and ignorant condemnations of Islam as singularly vile and barbaric. Both the threads at Danger Room and this comment at Max Forte's Open Anthropology show a disregard for the lives and efforts of people to stabilize Afghanistan, calling it "imperialism".
While I like debate on the issues, I find the tone a bit disturbing, as the raw emotion prevents any reasoned discussion. Max, an ardent critic of both HTS and social scientist's involvement with the military, used the occasion and the comments at Danger Room to advance his thesis that American activities in Afghanistan as imperialism, even when they go beyond the role of actual combat, and a way to look at what he calls the "American culture of war and fear". Although I don't agree with all of his criticisms of HTS, Max has a valid point in using this circumstance to get at some of these issues.
However, I do have some issues with the presentation and Open Anthropology on this occasion. Max's portrayal of Loyd's position seems designed to support his interpretation:
, and a former employee of the United Nations. While in Afghanistan she was a contractor for BAE Systems, which runs the HTS pilot for the DoD. So she was a civilian, not a member of the United States military. She did place herself in harm's way, both for pay and to further what she apparently saw as the greater good for both Americans and Afghans, but this should lead her to expect the threat of bombs and bullets, not of being doused in gasoline and set alight for the crime of asking about fuel prices. This type of attack is not one generally used by and against combatants, but against women and girls that step outside the rigidly defined roles created by an ultra-conservative subset of Afghan society.
Part of the issue with Max's analysis is that he is operating from the assumption that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is inherently imperial in the manner of 19th century imperial efforts. In this mode combatants, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and NGOs that cooperate with U.S. or NATO forces become part of the imperial mission, and Ms. Loyd becomes a tool in the mythology and ideology of that mission. As may already be obvious, I tend to disagree with this interpretation of the war in Afghanistan (though Iraq is a different story). In Afghanistan we have a failed state that is the result of a civil war and the 1979 Soviet invasion, and our own failure to help rebuild and stabilize Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Current operations are the result of the Taliban's willingness to allow terrorist organizations to operate from Afghan soil in conducting attacks against the United States, and an understanding that developing stability in Afghanistan is in the American interest. While this could lead to an imperial venture, it does not of necessity have to do so. I'm not sure that the link between reconstruction and stabilization and combat operations is automatically imperial in nature.
Paula Loyd's death as a result of burns sustained when serving as a member of a Human Terrain Team in Afghanistan is creating a virtual firestorm of reaction from both the left and right of the political spectrum. The comment threads at Michael Yon's website, and at Wired's Danger Room show some disturbing and ignorant condemnations of Islam as singularly vile and barbaric. Both the threads at Danger Room and this comment at Max Forte's Open Anthropology show a disregard for the lives and efforts of people to stabilize Afghanistan, calling it "imperialism".
While I like debate on the issues, I find the tone a bit disturbing, as the raw emotion prevents any reasoned discussion. Max, an ardent critic of both HTS and social scientist's involvement with the military, used the occasion and the comments at Danger Room to advance his thesis that American activities in Afghanistan as imperialism, even when they go beyond the role of actual combat, and a way to look at what he calls the "American culture of war and fear". Although I don't agree with all of his criticisms of HTS, Max has a valid point in using this circumstance to get at some of these issues.
However, I do have some issues with the presentation and Open Anthropology on this occasion. Max's portrayal of Loyd's position seems designed to support his interpretation:
Attached to a military unit, and the fact that she was a low ranking army officer, seems to vanish as some translate her into a “noncombatant” akin to a nurse, doctor, or priest. As expected, for some her image has morphed into one of a saint, even a Joan of Arc.While she was attached to a military unit, and in the company of soldiers and civilians in various roles, Ms. Loyd was not an Army officer. Unless I've missed something, she was a former U.S. Army Reserve Staff Sgt who deployed to Bosnia, a former civilian employee of the State Department
, and a former employee of the United Nations. While in Afghanistan she was a contractor for BAE Systems, which runs the HTS pilot for the DoD. So she was a civilian, not a member of the United States military. She did place herself in harm's way, both for pay and to further what she apparently saw as the greater good for both Americans and Afghans, but this should lead her to expect the threat of bombs and bullets, not of being doused in gasoline and set alight for the crime of asking about fuel prices. This type of attack is not one generally used by and against combatants, but against women and girls that step outside the rigidly defined roles created by an ultra-conservative subset of Afghan society.Part of the issue with Max's analysis is that he is operating from the assumption that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is inherently imperial in the manner of 19th century imperial efforts. In this mode combatants, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and NGOs that cooperate with U.S. or NATO forces become part of the imperial mission, and Ms. Loyd becomes a tool in the mythology and ideology of that mission. As may already be obvious, I tend to disagree with this interpretation of the war in Afghanistan (though Iraq is a different story). In Afghanistan we have a failed state that is the result of a civil war and the 1979 Soviet invasion, and our own failure to help rebuild and stabilize Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Current operations are the result of the Taliban's willingness to allow terrorist organizations to operate from Afghan soil in conducting attacks against the United States, and an understanding that developing stability in Afghanistan is in the American interest. While this could lead to an imperial venture, it does not of necessity have to do so. I'm not sure that the link between reconstruction and stabilization and combat operations is automatically imperial in nature.
New explanation for Aztec Epidemics
Posted by Chris at 7/18/2006 9:38 PM ...
Discover magazine has an interesting article discussing alternatives to the view that European diseases spread by the conquistadores wiped out Aztec civilization through successive epidemics between 1519 and 1619. In 1519, when Cortez arrived, the population of Mexico stood at approximately 22 million people. A century later that figure dropped to the neighborhood of 2 million people, which means that over the course of one hundred years the population dropped by 90%. I can't even imagine what that must have been like for the Aztecs - imagine if 9 out of every 10 people in the United States died due to disease over the course of the next three generations. Our society would never recover - just like the Aztecs.
Mexican epidemiologist Rodolfo Acuña-Soto decided to take a closer look at the epidemics that wiped out the Aztecs because things just didn't make sense to him. The traditional account says that European diseases like smallpox, combined with Spanish brutality and taxes did in the Aztecs. This is supported by at least some of the evidence - half of the indigenous peoples of the West Indies died from small pox by 1512, and the Spanish themselves admitted that smallpox and mistreatment of native peoples led to their demise.
Acuña-Soto doesn't believe this any more than the Aztecs, who called smallpox "zahuatl", and were evidently familiar with the disease before the arrival of the Spanish, although Cortez' arrival does seem to have triggered year-long outbreaks in 1520 and 1531. The disease that laid the Aztecs low, called "cocolitzli" arrived in 1545 and 1576, and, according to Acuña-Soto was a whole new animal. Based on the descriptions of the symptoms and the movement of disease found in Spanish census data, Acuña-Soto believes that cocolitzli was a type of hemorrhagic fever. The descriptions from period autopsies are gruesome, and fit more with Ebola or Dengue Fever than smallpox or typhus:
So what does this mean for those of us who teach this era? Well, it challenges the basic ideas in all of our U.S. History and Western Civilization textbooks: that disease brought by Europeans wiped out the native peoples of Central and North America. These peoples still suffered mightily at the hands of Europeans, but if Acuña-Soto's research is correct, the disease that wiped out the Aztecs in Central America was not smallpox or another European disease. Since the drought that Acuña-Soto believes was the catalyst for the major epidemics of cocolitzli extended to most of the continent, did it also impact the inhabitants of North America? Most histories assume that North American Indians were substantially impacted by disease introduced by the Spanish in Mexico, which traveled north and east, creating the "empty" continent that Americans then expanded into (of course, empty is a relative term here, as there were still a large number of Native Americans living in North America when American western expansion began. Americans just saw the place as "empty").
Discover magazine has an interesting article discussing alternatives to the view that European diseases spread by the conquistadores wiped out Aztec civilization through successive epidemics between 1519 and 1619. In 1519, when Cortez arrived, the population of Mexico stood at approximately 22 million people. A century later that figure dropped to the neighborhood of 2 million people, which means that over the course of one hundred years the population dropped by 90%. I can't even imagine what that must have been like for the Aztecs - imagine if 9 out of every 10 people in the United States died due to disease over the course of the next three generations. Our society would never recover - just like the Aztecs.
Mexican epidemiologist Rodolfo Acuña-Soto decided to take a closer look at the epidemics that wiped out the Aztecs because things just didn't make sense to him. The traditional account says that European diseases like smallpox, combined with Spanish brutality and taxes did in the Aztecs. This is supported by at least some of the evidence - half of the indigenous peoples of the West Indies died from small pox by 1512, and the Spanish themselves admitted that smallpox and mistreatment of native peoples led to their demise.
Acuña-Soto doesn't believe this any more than the Aztecs, who called smallpox "zahuatl", and were evidently familiar with the disease before the arrival of the Spanish, although Cortez' arrival does seem to have triggered year-long outbreaks in 1520 and 1531. The disease that laid the Aztecs low, called "cocolitzli" arrived in 1545 and 1576, and, according to Acuña-Soto was a whole new animal. Based on the descriptions of the symptoms and the movement of disease found in Spanish census data, Acuña-Soto believes that cocolitzli was a type of hemorrhagic fever. The descriptions from period autopsies are gruesome, and fit more with Ebola or Dengue Fever than smallpox or typhus:
The fevers were contagious, burning, and continuous, all of them pestilential, in most part lethal. The tongue was dry and black. Enormous thirst. Urine of the colors of sea-green, vegetal green, and black, sometimes passing from the greenish color to the pale. Pulse was frequent, fast, small, and weak—sometimes even null. The eyes and the whole body were yellow. This stage was followed by delirium and seizures. Then, hard and painful nodules appeared behind one or both ears along with heartache, chest pain, abdominal pain, tremor, great anxiety, and dysentery. The blood that flowed when cutting a vein had a green color or was very pale, dry, and without serosity. . . . Blood flowed from the ears and in many cases blood truly gushed from the nose. . . . This epidemic attacked mainly young people and seldom the elder ones.What this means, and Acuña-Soto claims, is that the Spanish did not bring this disease to Mexico, but that it was already there living in an animal or insect host. He believes that the fever was introduced to a populace weakened by the Spanish conquest during periods of drought, when rodents passed the disease among themselves and poverty stricken native inhabitants came into frequent contact with them. The question now, then, is whether this disease could resurface in modern Mexico.
So what does this mean for those of us who teach this era? Well, it challenges the basic ideas in all of our U.S. History and Western Civilization textbooks: that disease brought by Europeans wiped out the native peoples of Central and North America. These peoples still suffered mightily at the hands of Europeans, but if Acuña-Soto's research is correct, the disease that wiped out the Aztecs in Central America was not smallpox or another European disease. Since the drought that Acuña-Soto believes was the catalyst for the major epidemics of cocolitzli extended to most of the continent, did it also impact the inhabitants of North America? Most histories assume that North American Indians were substantially impacted by disease introduced by the Spanish in Mexico, which traveled north and east, creating the "empty" continent that Americans then expanded into (of course, empty is a relative term here, as there were still a large number of Native Americans living in North America when American western expansion began. Americans just saw the place as "empty").
The Pop Culture Divide
Posted by Chris at 9/7/2008 4:50 PM ...
During our discussion of Playing Cards in Cairo, Tim, Grandmasta and I pondered whether Cairenes (or other Egyptians) really interacted with American pop culture in the way Hugh Miles indicated. Grandmasta argues that only upper class Egyptians would have the kind of contact with American media to identify Oprah or other celebrities. I can't disagree, as he and Tim are the ones with actual experience of Egypt, and it also makes sense. How many poor people will have access to satellite television, or be interested in American shows?
Still, people in other nations are familiar with American pop culture in ways we are not with theirs. This applies to both industrial and developing nations. We still don't have an explanation for why, other than parochialism of ourselves and our media. Tim's example was of Umm Kulthoum, an Egyptian star of the 1950's and 1960's. One source claims she was the most popular musician of the last century in the Middle East, but I had not heard of her until Tim mentioned it. I might have heard her name before, but if I did, I certainly don't remember it. Still, you would think that at least educated Americans would know her name.
I imagine that these days the only way for a celebrity from the Middle East to penetrate the awareness of modern Americans is to appear in an Hollywood film, or to die tragically in a scandal involving an important politician, as did Lebanese star Suzanne Tamim, who was recently murdered in Dubai. Despite the location of the article on CNN.com, I imagine most people in the United States skimmed right over it. In fact, I probably only clicked the link due to my conversation Tim about just this issue.
Why care? Mostly this is a symptom of Americans' isolation from the rest of the world, similar to, but less problematic than, not learning a foreign language. Being more familiar with the pop culture of other nations can only help us understand them better, which to me would reduce the fear of the unknown most people get when they encounter folks from distant places, or when those places pop up on the news. And, no, anime, manga, and Iron Chef, don't count.
During our discussion of Playing Cards in Cairo, Tim, Grandmasta and I pondered whether Cairenes (or other Egyptians) really interacted with American pop culture in the way Hugh Miles indicated. Grandmasta argues that only upper class Egyptians would have the kind of contact with American media to identify Oprah or other celebrities. I can't disagree, as he and Tim are the ones with actual experience of Egypt, and it also makes sense. How many poor people will have access to satellite television, or be interested in American shows?
Still, people in other nations are familiar with American pop culture in ways we are not with theirs. This applies to both industrial and developing nations. We still don't have an explanation for why, other than parochialism of ourselves and our media. Tim's example was of Umm Kulthoum, an Egyptian star of the 1950's and 1960's. One source claims she was the most popular musician of the last century in the Middle East, but I had not heard of her until Tim mentioned it. I might have heard her name before, but if I did, I certainly don't remember it. Still, you would think that at least educated Americans would know her name.
I imagine that these days the only way for a celebrity from the Middle East to penetrate the awareness of modern Americans is to appear in an Hollywood film, or to die tragically in a scandal involving an important politician, as did Lebanese star Suzanne Tamim, who was recently murdered in Dubai. Despite the location of the article on CNN.com, I imagine most people in the United States skimmed right over it. In fact, I probably only clicked the link due to my conversation Tim about just this issue.
Why care? Mostly this is a symptom of Americans' isolation from the rest of the world, similar to, but less problematic than, not learning a foreign language. Being more familiar with the pop culture of other nations can only help us understand them better, which to me would reduce the fear of the unknown most people get when they encounter folks from distant places, or when those places pop up on the news. And, no, anime, manga, and Iron Chef, don't count.
An Anthropologist Responds
Posted by Chris at 11/23/2007 10:58 PM ...
Dr. Marcus Griffin has a thoughtful and insightful discussion of the problems with the American Anthropological Association's Executive Board's decision to denounce the Human Terrain System developed to help American troops stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. I urge you to go read his complete post, but a couple of things stand out to me:
Dr. Marcus Griffin has a thoughtful and insightful discussion of the problems with the American Anthropological Association's Executive Board's decision to denounce the Human Terrain System developed to help American troops stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. I urge you to go read his complete post, but a couple of things stand out to me:
- The Executive Board of the AAA did not actually conduct a systematic study of HTS and its work. This means that their decisions are based on second and third hand information, assumptions about the HTS teams, and assumptions of the U.S. Army and its mission. In part the AAA's objections about the HTS seems to derive as much from opposition to the war in Iraq than any understanding of what social scientists are doing, or what the Army's mission actually is. This seems like a fundamentally flawed way to do things to me.
- A main concern of the AAA is that the studied population not be harmed as a result of being studied, either by the observation process or by deliberate use of the study data. Specifically, the AAA is concerned that the data HTS generates might be used to target individuals for assassination or imprisonment. As Dr. Griffin points out this is a valid concern, but illustrates an inherent misunderstanding of the Army's pacification mission, and distrust of the Army as an organization. Some of misunderstanding and distrust is a legacy of the Vietnam War and the 1960's, specifically public perception of Project Phoenix and other Vietnam-era COIN activities. Distrust and lack of respect for the Bush Administration in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, debates over torture, and the CIA's "black" prisons also play a role here. I think, though, that a huge amount of the lack of understanding and trust of the Army in this arena has a lot to do with the separation between the military and the civilian components of American society since the draft ended in the 1970's. Most Americans have little direct connection or understanding of the military - as Mark R. Stoneman blogged about today. What this means is that the folks in the AAA likely have only the collective memory of a dark past and their fears about the present to inform their opinions of both the military and its missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. I'm not sure what the best way to combat this problem is - some people have suggested reinstating the draft, while others advocate for more inclusion of military history in the curriculum. Although I certainly see the attractions of the draft, my inclinations tend more toward the education end of the spectrum.
A Defining Issue
Posted by Chris at 11/30/2007 1:24 PM ...
Senator McCain's mindless support for President Bush in the aftermath of the 2000 election is one of the stranger things I've seen over the past seven years. He seems to find his old form in the debate over waterboarding and torture. His response to Mitt Romney's assertion that criminals like the terrorist Khalid Sheik Mohammed should just tortured and locked up in a CIA prison without due process is below:
Romney seems to get his advice on what is or isn't torture from Cofer Black, a former CIA officer who led the Counterterror Center from 1999-2002, and was later criticized for not telling the FBI that two of the September 11th terrorists had entered the United States after being identified in Afghanistan. Although Romney claims to get his advice from "former Generals", Black was not a General. He is now Vice Chairman of Blackwater and Romney's counter-terror guy. The interesting thing is that military and intelligence people generally argue that torture is counter-productive in that when people break, they will tell the interrogators anything to get the pain to stop. How much "evidence" or "intelligence" gathered this way is the ravings of someone desperate to get a torturer to stop?
John McCain is in a position to understand this, as his North Vietnamese captors used the method most debated these days to torture Senator McCain. He sees torture, quite correctly, as a moral and pragmatic issue. Not only do we lose the moral high ground by allowing people to conduct torture in our name, but we become our enemy. You can't criticize insurgents for beheading someone or dragging them through the streets when the world knows very well that you are breaking both your own and international laws by torturing prisoners. It also releases all of your current and future enemies from any constraints they might operate under when they capture your personnel. Our use of torture means that we can't insist that our people be treated properly when captured.
Like Senator McCain, I see torture as a defining issue for our nation. Do we torture, or not? Do we obey the law, or not? Are we civilized, or not? Do we stand for our ideals, or not?
Senator McCain's mindless support for President Bush in the aftermath of the 2000 election is one of the stranger things I've seen over the past seven years. He seems to find his old form in the debate over waterboarding and torture. His response to Mitt Romney's assertion that criminals like the terrorist Khalid Sheik Mohammed should just tortured and locked up in a CIA prison without due process is below:
Well, then you would have to advocate that we withdraw from the Geneva Conventions, which were for the treatment of people who were held prisoners, whether they be illegal combatants or regular prisoners of war. Because it's clear the definition of torture. It's in violation of laws we have passed. And again, I would hope that we would understand, my friends, that life is not "24" and Jack Bauer. Life is interrogation techniques which are humane and yet effective. And I just came back from visiting a prison in Iraq. The Army general there said that techniques under the Army Field Manual are working and working effectively, and he didn't think they need to do anything else. My friends, this is what America is all about. This is a defining issue and, clearly, we should be able, if we want to be commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, to take a definite and positive position on, and that is, we will never allow torture to take place in the United States of America.
Romney seems to get his advice on what is or isn't torture from Cofer Black, a former CIA officer who led the Counterterror Center from 1999-2002, and was later criticized for not telling the FBI that two of the September 11th terrorists had entered the United States after being identified in Afghanistan. Although Romney claims to get his advice from "former Generals", Black was not a General. He is now Vice Chairman of Blackwater and Romney's counter-terror guy. The interesting thing is that military and intelligence people generally argue that torture is counter-productive in that when people break, they will tell the interrogators anything to get the pain to stop. How much "evidence" or "intelligence" gathered this way is the ravings of someone desperate to get a torturer to stop?
John McCain is in a position to understand this, as his North Vietnamese captors used the method most debated these days to torture Senator McCain. He sees torture, quite correctly, as a moral and pragmatic issue. Not only do we lose the moral high ground by allowing people to conduct torture in our name, but we become our enemy. You can't criticize insurgents for beheading someone or dragging them through the streets when the world knows very well that you are breaking both your own and international laws by torturing prisoners. It also releases all of your current and future enemies from any constraints they might operate under when they capture your personnel. Our use of torture means that we can't insist that our people be treated properly when captured.
Like Senator McCain, I see torture as a defining issue for our nation. Do we torture, or not? Do we obey the law, or not? Are we civilized, or not? Do we stand for our ideals, or not?
Army Social Scientist Attacked
Posted by Chris at 11/7/2008 9:59 AM ...
Please join me in sending my best wishes to Paula Loyd, a human terrain team member who was set on fire by a member of the Taliban when she asked him a question about gas prices. His response was to douse her with fuel from his jug and set her alight, a common Taliban punishment for women they consider insufficiently modest.
Please join me in sending my best wishes to Paula Loyd, a human terrain team member who was set on fire by a member of the Taliban when she asked him a question about gas prices. His response was to douse her with fuel from his jug and set her alight, a common Taliban punishment for women they consider insufficiently modest.
While I'm an advocate of both women in combat and of the use of civilians in Human Terrain Teams, this third casualty among the social scientists does raise important questions. First, and most obvious, is the role of female social scientists in dealing with unknown individuals in Afghanistan given the nature of this attack. Loyd's assailant displayed no hostile intent until he attacked. The question is whether this is a reasonable level of risk for these valuable team members?
The other question is whether peace is possible with such men? Both the idealist and pragmatist in me argue that there is some common ground, and the cosmopolitan in me says we shouldn't impose our standards on other cultures. Not that setting women on fire because dare speak in public is a standard that deserves any protection.
I'm afraid that this one has penetrated my rational facade, and I really don't have much useful to add at this point.
*grumble*
Three Cups of Tea
Posted by Chris at 12/18/2008 1:08 PM...
A couple of months ago I began reading books like Playing Cards in Cairo (see my comments here) and Three Cups of Tea as an effort to develop more of a feel for the cultures of different parts of the Middle East. Books like these get classified as "leisure" reading because they are so enjoyable to read, and I don't expect to have to pull facts and arguments out of them. In other words, there's no stress involved, unlike the other 90% of my reading load (try having to explain St. Augustine's City of God Against the Pagans after only six days to read it sometime).
Three Cups of Tea is the story of Greg Mortenson, a former mountain climber who experienced an epiphany of sorts following a failed attempt to climb K2. When he finally stumbled off the mountain, Mortenson was saved by the hospitality of villagers in Pakistan's Karakoram mountains. Overwhelmed by both the villagers' generosity and and their extreme poverty, Mortenson pledged to return to the village of Korphe to build a school for its children. The villagers, of course, didn't really believe him. Returning to Pakistan after raising money to build the school, Mortenson faced issues of corruption and making the contacts to get the work done. He also found that before building a school for Korphe, the villagers wanted and needed something even more basic - a bridge allowing communication between Korphe and Skardu across the river gorge separating them. A bridge would make it easier to bring supplies in to build the school, allow villagers to visit family on the other side of the gorge, and hopefully help Korphe's economy.
Over the next decade, Mortenson built fifty-five schools in remote areas, focusing on the need for education for girls. Along the way, he faced challenges from local imams opposed to educating girls, encounters with the Taliban, and struggles for funding. He ultimately turned down funding from the United States government to build hundreds of his schools after 2001 because he realized that the taint of government association would undo any good the schools could provide.
Ignoring the hagiographic nature of the text, which journalist David Oliver Relin wrote in cooperation with Mortenson, it contains several important messages for American efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The first is that there is no cookie cutter approach to dealing with these areas. The siting, size, and construction of the schools has to be fitted to the individual towns. Infrastructure and political groundwork have to be created in each village - like Korphe's bridge. Funding for upkeep and to pay teachers is also critical - one of the current criticisms with American efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is that schools and hospitals are built without providing supplies or staff. A second important, even critical message, is that personal relationships are the key to getting things done. A faceless bureaucracy of interchangeable staff won't do the trick. Mortenson developed the relationships that allowed his successes over the course of years of return visits. For this reason, relief efforts cannot by run from the United States. The responsible parties have to be onsite to ensure that things run smoothly. Finally, there is the question of government involvement. Even in these strained times, the U.S. government has the capability to organize and direct vast resources, but that involvement can also be counterproductive whe it comes to dealing with people in the remote reaches of the globe. This creates a conundrum for efforts to bring schools and clinics to rural areas - slow progress due to lack of funding and staff, or fast progress of questionable value.
A couple of months ago I began reading books like Playing Cards in Cairo (see my comments here) and Three Cups of Tea as an effort to develop more of a feel for the cultures of different parts of the Middle East. Books like these get classified as "leisure" reading because they are so enjoyable to read, and I don't expect to have to pull facts and arguments out of them. In other words, there's no stress involved, unlike the other 90% of my reading load (try having to explain St. Augustine's City of God Against the Pagans after only six days to read it sometime).
Three Cups of Tea is the story of Greg Mortenson
, a former mountain climber who experienced an epiphany of sorts following a failed attempt to climb K2. When he finally stumbled off the mountain, Mortenson was saved by the hospitality of villagers in Pakistan's Karakoram mountains. Overwhelmed by both the villagers' generosity and and their extreme poverty, Mortenson pledged to return to the village of Korphe to build a school for its children. The villagers, of course, didn't really believe him. Returning to Pakistan after raising money to build the school, Mortenson faced issues of corruption and making the contacts to get the work done. He also found that before building a school for Korphe, the villagers wanted and needed something even more basic - a bridge allowing communication between Korphe and Skardu across the river gorge separating them. A bridge would make it easier to bring supplies in to build the school, allow villagers to visit family on the other side of the gorge, and hopefully help Korphe's economy.Over the next decade, Mortenson built fifty-five schools in remote areas, focusing on the need for education for girls. Along the way, he faced challenges from local imams opposed to educating girls, encounters with the Taliban, and struggles for funding. He ultimately turned down funding from the United States government to build hundreds of his schools after 2001 because he realized that the taint of government association would undo any good the schools could provide.
Ignoring the hagiographic nature of the text, which journalist David Oliver Relin wrote in cooperation with Mortenson, it contains several important messages for American efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The first is that there is no cookie cutter approach to dealing with these areas. The siting, size, and construction of the schools has to be fitted to the individual towns. Infrastructure and political groundwork have to be created in each village - like Korphe's bridge. Funding for upkeep and to pay teachers is also critical - one of the current criticisms with American efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is that schools and hospitals are built without providing supplies or staff. A second important, even critical message, is that personal relationships are the key to getting things done. A faceless bureaucracy of interchangeable staff won't do the trick. Mortenson developed the relationships that allowed his successes over the course of years of return visits. For this reason, relief efforts cannot by run from the United States. The responsible parties have to be onsite to ensure that things run smoothly. Finally, there is the question of government involvement. Even in these strained times, the U.S. government has the capability to organize and direct vast resources, but that involvement can also be counterproductive whe it comes to dealing with people in the remote reaches of the globe. This creates a conundrum for efforts to bring schools and clinics to rural areas - slow progress due to lack of funding and staff, or fast progress of questionable value.
The Value of Cultural Knowledge
Posted by Chris at 5/11/2008 2:32 PM ...
Patrick at Kings of War plugs his eventual book while discussing the problems with the U.S. military assumption that concepts of honor and compensation after family members are killed by coalition forces is somehow exotic or uniquely "Arab". While how these concepts work in Iraq may be different than in the United States, he brings up a valid point: when a family member is killed by trigger happy goons in the pay of a foreign power, how many Americans would be satisfied by a nominal cash pay-off without, with no apology or promise to do better. With no recourse to law, we're likely to take things into our own hands, and play it off as justice done, or reference it back to the mythical "Wild West".
Patrick at Kings of War plugs his eventual book while discussing the problems with the U.S. military assumption that concepts of honor and compensation after family members are killed by coalition forces is somehow exotic or uniquely "Arab". While how these concepts work in Iraq may be different than in the United States, he brings up a valid point: when a family member is killed by trigger happy goons in the pay of a foreign power, how many Americans would be satisfied by a nominal cash pay-off without, with no apology or promise to do better. With no recourse to law, we're likely to take things into our own hands, and play it off as justice done, or reference it back to the mythical "Wild West".
The Importance of Language
Posted by Chris at 5/15/2008 7:32 PM ...
Last week Jeffrey Imm at Counterterrorism Blog provided another attack on the new language guidelines from discussing the activities of terrorists such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. As Imm's post shows, this is a political issue, but it shows it in a way that most people aren't getting - for many people this is about domestic politics, not international diplomacy or even being smart about fighting terrorism.
In this particular case, Imm was upset because the Congressmembers serving on the House Permanent Select Committee refused to include Rep Hoekstra's amendment that attempted to exclude any potential labeling guidelines, like those proposed by the State Department, for the Intelligence community. Imm and Hoekstra see these guidelines as somehow damaging the ability for Intelligence services to do their jobs. Imm argues that the label "jihadis" is necessary for Intelligence services to define the threat, and says that the failure to define this enemy is why the Authorization for the Use of Military Force passed in September 2001 has not resulted in a grand strategy to combat Islamic extremists. His issue, and that of Rep Hoekstra, is "Al-Qaeda knows point blank that they want to kill Americans. How sad is it that as we approach the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, we are still debating how to define our enemy?"
Imm continues his campaign against the strategic use of language today in a tirade against the Daily Kos' adoption of the same concept of not calling terrorists "jihadists" because the main proponent, Amad, participated in the Texas Dawah convention and websites that also include supporters of include supporters of violent extremist groups. The idea is to discredit the whole effort to develop American strategic use of language by linking it to terrorists and their supporters. After all, only they would want to hide the truth linking jihad and terrorism from the American public right?
Imm does get one critical thing right, though. DHS refuses to disclose those individuals and organizations outside the government that provided advice on the new policy governing language in discussing terrorism. This is important information to have, just as the information surrounding Vice President Dick Cheney's infamous Energy Task Force was. My guess is that we won't get details about either for a long time. Still we do need to understand where the new guidelines come from in order to understand how they came about. However, what folks like Imm, Hoekstra, and Senator McCain need to keep in mind is that just because some of the supporters of the new guidelines also support terror tactics or violent struggle against Israel, does not automatically negate the utility or validity of the new guidelines. These are the same concepts that anthropologists and ethnologists have been advocating for quite awhile. Finding and adopting these things is the whole point of Project Minerva and the Human Terrain System - using the humanities to further our policy and security goals.
The problem with Imm's analysis, indeed his question, is that it cedes the biggest, most significant, battleground to the enemy - the hearts and minds of the people.
The problem is that using the label "jihadis", "islamists", or "mujahedeen" when describing terrorists validates them in the mind of Muslims worldwide. It also serves to increase anti-Muslim sentiment here in the United States to no purpose other than keeping people afraid of young, religious men from the Middle East. A careful reading of the Department of Homeland Security and National Counter Terrorism Center memorandums regarding appropriate use of language addresses the first of these issues very clearly. They do not mince words about who the enemy is, but rather propose that the United States Government be conscious of the strategic importance of language in fighting against terrorists for the first time since September 11th, 2001. (Hat tip to Matt Armstrong, who posted links to the originals)
All of the concepts and guidelines in these documents are common sense:
Last week Jeffrey Imm at Counterterrorism Blog provided another attack on the new language guidelines from discussing the activities of terrorists such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. As Imm's post shows, this is a political issue, but it shows it in a way that most people aren't getting - for many people this is about domestic politics, not international diplomacy or even being smart about fighting terrorism.
In this particular case, Imm was upset because the Congressmembers serving on the House Permanent Select Committee refused to include Rep Hoekstra's amendment that attempted to exclude any potential labeling guidelines, like those proposed by the State Department
, for the Intelligence community. Imm and Hoekstra see these guidelines as somehow damaging the ability for Intelligence services to do their jobs. Imm argues that the label "jihadis" is necessary for Intelligence services to define the threat, and says that the failure to define this enemy is why the Authorization for the Use of Military Force passed in September 2001 has not resulted in a grand strategy to combat Islamic extremists. His issue, and that of Rep Hoekstra, is "Al-Qaeda knows point blank that they want to kill Americans. How sad is it that as we approach the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, we are still debating how to define our enemy?"Imm continues his campaign against the strategic use of language today in a tirade against the Daily Kos' adoption of the same concept of not calling terrorists "jihadists" because the main proponent, Amad, participated in the Texas Dawah convention and websites that also include supporters of include supporters of violent extremist groups. The idea is to discredit the whole effort to develop American strategic use of language by linking it to terrorists and their supporters. After all, only they would want to hide the truth linking jihad and terrorism from the American public right?
Imm does get one critical thing right, though. DHS refuses to disclose those individuals and organizations outside the government that provided advice on the new policy governing language in discussing terrorism. This is important information to have, just as the information surrounding Vice President Dick Cheney's infamous Energy Task Force was. My guess is that we won't get details about either for a long time. Still we do need to understand where the new guidelines come from in order to understand how they came about. However, what folks like Imm, Hoekstra, and Senator McCain
need to keep in mind is that just because some of the supporters of the new guidelines also support terror tactics or violent struggle against Israel, does not automatically negate the utility or validity of the new guidelines. These are the same concepts that anthropologists and ethnologists have been advocating for quite awhile. Finding and adopting these things is the whole point of Project Minerva and the Human Terrain System - using the humanities to further our policy and security goals.The problem with Imm's analysis, indeed his question, is that it cedes the biggest, most significant, battleground to the enemy - the hearts and minds of the people.
The problem is that using the label "jihadis", "islamists", or "mujahedeen" when describing terrorists validates them in the mind of Muslims worldwide. It also serves to increase anti-Muslim sentiment here in the United States to no purpose other than keeping people afraid of young, religious men from the Middle East. A careful reading of the Department of Homeland Security
and National Counter Terrorism Center memorandums regarding appropriate use of language addresses the first of these issues very clearly. They do not mince words about who the enemy is, but rather propose that the United States Government be conscious of the strategic importance of language in fighting against terrorists for the first time since September 11th, 2001. (Hat tip to Matt Armstrong, who posted links to the originals)All of the concepts and guidelines in these documents are common sense:
- Don't use Arabic terms, especially religious terms. that most American politicians and diplomats don't have the cultural knowledge to use correctly. Examples include using "Qutbist" to discuss the ideology that provides the theological framework allowing Muslims to engage in acts of terrorism that might injure innocents, since mispronouncing it it might sound like the Arabic word for "books; or, calling terrorists "Salafis" because many non-violent Muslims might also consider themselves "Salafis".
- Avoid negative framing because people tend to miss the negative portion of the statement. Thus, stating that "we are not at war with Islam" might be heard as the opposite.
- Not using Arabic religious jargon such as "jihadist" or "mujahedin" to describe terrorists, as both words have positive connotations to Muslims. if you doubt this, think back on the days when the United States supported the Afghan mujahedin against the Soviets. It means "holy warrior", and is akin to the Medieval European designation of "Crusader". You definitely don't want to make your enemy seem like they are on the side of God.
- Use terms like "terrorist", "extremist", or "totalitarian" to describe the enemy. Everyone knows these designators as being the bad guys. By using these terms, you paint terrorists as what they are, delegitimize their goals and tactics, and avoid religiously charged terminology.
- Be positive - emphasize that terrorism is a global challenge, and that the goal of American efforts is to secure security for everyone. This addresses the concerns of both Americans and non-American Muslims. Similarly, promote the idea of striving for "progress", as opposed to "liberty", which too many people outside the United States may see as a code for American ideological domination.
- Pay attention and utilize the discourse on "takfirism" The word may not work coming from the mouths of Americans, but the concept is useful in describing terrorists, particularly those who assert that those who disagree with them, or who follow different religious doctrines are apostates who are legitimate targets. Takfiri ideology is widely condemned by mainstream Muslims. Along with irhabi, it makes a useful counter to those who label themselves as jihadis to gain support in Muslim communities.
Sources: NCTC and DHS.There's significantly more in the DHS document, so please be sure to read it. I think this is the first step to really embarking on a legitimate Information Operation to counter those of groups like al-Qaeda. The problem is that we need to get politicians who want to use loaded terms like Islamist, Islamofascist, and Jihadis for domestic political reasons to stop providing ammunition and legitimacy to terrorist groups. At the same time we need to find a way to get media organizations and political commentators to adopt these guidelines. Otherwise, efforts by the Federal government to change this discourse will meet significantly less success.
Preventing Extremists - Changing Belief Systems
Posted by Chris at 7/12/2008 12:29 PM ...
Tim Stevens at ubiwar.com does another great service by linking to Kathleen Meilahn's article The Strategic Landscape: Avoiding Future Generations of Violent Extremists (PDF). I haven't finished it yet, but the paragraph he quotes is very important in light of the recent BAA regarding proposal review for Project Minerva:
If research into belief formation and "countermeasures" is oriented toward countering the influence of al-Qaeda's violent theology and political message, thats not as morally questionable as say, trying to convince people to give up their faith or surreptitiously alter established tenets of faith for our own purposes. This points to a need both for basic research, but also for a coordinated and effective campaign of Information Warfare. This needs both a counter to al-Qaeda's ideology of violence, but also a repudiation of Qutbist theory in toto. This requires alliances with mainstream Muslim religious and political leaders throughout the world brave enough to publicly denounce violence in the name of religion. To work, this campaign could not be seen to be allied with the United States, or promoting U.S. goals. In other words, it would have to be promoting peace, stability, and change as a positive good for the people living in the Middle East.
Contrary to popular belief since 2001, antipathy for Americans and the United States government is not about "who we are", but about "what we do". U.S. policy in the Middle East drives anti-American sentiment through support of Israel, basing of troops in Saudi Arabia, and the invasion of Iraq. Those policy items are unlikely to change, so we must make efforts to be smarter in how we deliver our message and how we fight against terrorism.
More on this over the next few days...
Tim Stevens at ubiwar.com does another great service by linking to Kathleen Meilahn's article The Strategic Landscape: Avoiding Future Generations of Violent Extremists (PDF). I haven't finished it yet, but the paragraph he quotes is very important in light of the recent BAA regarding proposal review for Project Minerva:
Psycho-social and political factors play an important role in radicalization. Where Islamist Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) are concerned, these factors play a significant role in recruitment—versus just theology. However, once recruited, theology becomes the justification for violent actions. In the initial stages of al-Qaeda’s ascendancy, theological values that became politically radicalized were a driving factor motivating the core actors. As al-Qaeda (AQ) and other VEOs aim to increase in size, their recruitment process has become more oriented toward—or broadened to include—political issues, and those foot soldiers who volunteer are often psycho-socially motivated. Yet, in effect, AQ is “engaged in an unprecedented exercise of corrupting, misinterpreting and misrepresenting the word of God to generate support for their political mission.”
The highlighted sentence is what I'm most interested in here. This is an argument my wife and I have been making with people who try to blame terrorism on something inherent in Islam, but more importantly, it also allows us to approach that questionable sentence in Topic #4 of the BAA in a manner that doesn't evoke the excesses of the Vietnam War.Research on belief formation and emotional contagion will provide cultural advisors with better tools to understand the impact of operations on the local population. This research should also contribute to countermeasures to help revise or influence belief structures to reduce the likelihood of militant cells forming.
If research into belief formation and "countermeasures" is oriented toward countering the influence of al-Qaeda's violent theology and political message, thats not as morally questionable as say, trying to convince people to give up their faith or surreptitiously alter established tenets of faith for our own purposes. This points to a need both for basic research, but also for a coordinated and effective campaign of Information Warfare. This needs both a counter to al-Qaeda's ideology of violence, but also a repudiation of Qutbist theory in toto. This requires alliances with mainstream Muslim religious and political leaders throughout the world brave enough to publicly denounce violence in the name of religion. To work, this campaign could not be seen to be allied with the United States, or promoting U.S. goals. In other words, it would have to be promoting peace, stability, and change as a positive good for the people living in the Middle East.
Contrary to popular belief since 2001, antipathy for Americans and the United States government is not about "who we are", but about "what we do". U.S. policy in the Middle East drives anti-American sentiment through support of Israel, basing of troops in Saudi Arabia, and the invasion of Iraq. Those policy items are unlikely to change, so we must make efforts to be smarter in how we deliver our message and how we fight against terrorism.
More on this over the next few days...
Academia and the Military
Posted by Chris at 5/3/2007 9:32 AM ...
Abu Muqawama brought up an interesting issue yesterday, when he pointed out the challenges facing academics who lend their expertise to the military to enhance understanding of cultures that our troops suddenly find themselves operating in. Beyond the significant issue of simply getting heard by leaders when you have a message they either don't understand or don't want to understand, you have the idea among some academics that by helping out the military in this way, you are somehow aiding and abetting imperialism. As Abu Muqawama points out, having this information can not only save lives on both sides once a conflict starts, but could potentially alter decisions to use troops in the first place.
The immediate example is that of Montgomery McFate, of the U.S. Institute of Peace, who is working to convince military leaders that anthropology is an important tool for their arsenal. The potential for the use of Anthropology and History to prevent or wage wars is important - the challenges of both Vietnam and Iraq have roots in a lack of understanding the cultures our military operates in, with negative results for both the United States and the enemy of the moment. This goes to the heart of counter-insurgency doctrine, and could prevent not only casualties, but war crimes committed out of fear, frustration, revenge, anger, or the belief that only horrors inflicted will have a significant impact on an opponent's forces.
So there is an opportunity for social scientists and other academics to positively influence how the military operates by helping them understand other cultures. This includes simple thinsg like not insisting that Muslim women remove their hijabs at security checkpoints, or teaching language and social skills, but also includes helping soldiers understand the complexities of the history and culture of a place. All of things things influence how American actions and decisions are perceived by others, and also relates to how those decisions are made.
Of course, there is another side to this issue: is it ethical for academics, particularly social scientists who work closely with their subjects as anthropologists do, to work in the disguise of peace and understanding to then use their new knowledge and skills with the military for the purpose of subjugating foreign lands? I think this goes back to the issue of Just War. If you fight only Just Wars, based on the Augustinian doctrine, this is no problem - you are defending yourself and others from a legitimate and potent threat. However, if there are ulterior motives involved (we need natural resources, want revenge, think we are morally/intellectually superior), you may well have a moral and ethical dilemma.
Abu Muqawama brought up an interesting issue yesterday, when he pointed out the challenges facing academics who lend their expertise to the military to enhance understanding of cultures that our troops suddenly find themselves operating in. Beyond the significant issue of simply getting heard by leaders when you have a message they either don't understand or don't want to understand, you have the idea among some academics that by helping out the military in this way, you are somehow aiding and abetting imperialism. As Abu Muqawama points out, having this information can not only save lives on both sides once a conflict starts, but could potentially alter decisions to use troops in the first place.
The immediate example is that of Montgomery McFate, of the U.S. Institute of Peace, who is working to convince military leaders that anthropology is an important tool for their arsenal. The potential for the use of Anthropology and History to prevent or wage wars is important - the challenges of both Vietnam and Iraq have roots in a lack of understanding the cultures our military operates in, with negative results for both the United States and the enemy of the moment. This goes to the heart of counter-insurgency doctrine, and could prevent not only casualties, but war crimes committed out of fear, frustration, revenge, anger, or the belief that only horrors inflicted will have a significant impact on an opponent's forces.
So there is an opportunity for social scientists and other academics to positively influence how the military operates by helping them understand other cultures. This includes simple thinsg like not insisting that Muslim women remove their hijabs at security checkpoints, or teaching language and social skills, but also includes helping soldiers understand the complexities of the history and culture of a place. All of things things influence how American actions and decisions are perceived by others, and also relates to how those decisions are made.
Of course, there is another side to this issue: is it ethical for academics, particularly social scientists who work closely with their subjects as anthropologists do, to work in the disguise of peace and understanding to then use their new knowledge and skills with the military for the purpose of subjugating foreign lands? I think this goes back to the issue of Just War. If you fight only Just Wars, based on the Augustinian doctrine, this is no problem - you are defending yourself and others from a legitimate and potent threat. However, if there are ulterior motives involved (we need natural resources, want revenge, think we are morally/intellectually superior), you may well have a moral and ethical dilemma.
About Those "Strategic" Corporals
Posted by Chris at 5/18/2008 9:08 PM ...
The importance of the "strategic corporal" gets a lot of attention in circles discussing counterinsurgency methods, particularly when it comes to making smart decisions in dealing with civilians and whether to use force in a given situation. There is also a lot of attention paid to the importance of cultural knowledge in our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the importance of showing Muslims that the United States is not at war with Islam. General Petraeus has preached the importance of counterinsurgency, the Department of Defense created the Human Terrain System and hired anthropologists, and Secretary of Defense Gates announced Project Minerva to enhance the connection between the humanities and the military.
And now this.
A United States Army Staff Sergeant, an E-6 for those of you who care, admitted to using a Qu'ran for target practice, writing "Fuck yeah" on the torn remains, and leaving it in the dust.
Luckily when an Iraqi militiaman found the Qu'ran and reported, American officers took the matter seriously, apologized publicly, and presented local clan leaders with a new copy of the Qu'ran. At the very least this shows some appreciation of the importance of acknowledging problems and dealing with them quickly and decisively to show our allies that we take their concerns seriously. With any luck, this unfortunate episode will stop here, and not lead to more violence in Iraq or provide al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups with more propaganda fodder.
There's a bigger issue at play here, though. You can't force soldiers (or any one else) to be culturally sensitive no matter how much training and experience they have, and you can't force them to respect people different than they are. However, you can provide them enough training that they understand that desecrating religious symbols will cause problems, and to at least police up after themselves when they do something stupid. What the hell was this NCO thinking? This isn't PFC or a new corporal with only a few years of experience we're talking about here. This was an act by a career NCO responsible for leading other soldiers and providing a good example for them. If we can't trust these folks to do the right thing in Iraq, how are we supposed to expect that the "strategic corporals" are going to get it?
It's all well and good that Petraeus and other senior officers preach the counterinsurgency gospel, but if the soldiers who have to do the work don't buy in to it, then it won't do any good. While this may be an isolated incident, I think it's time for some serious looks at the training and leadership of troops headed to Iraq.
The importance of the "strategic corporal" gets a lot of attention in circles discussing counterinsurgency methods, particularly when it comes to making smart decisions in dealing with civilians and whether to use force in a given situation. There is also a lot of attention paid to the importance of cultural knowledge in our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the importance of showing Muslims that the United States is not at war with Islam. General Petraeus has preached the importance of counterinsurgency, the Department of Defense created the Human Terrain System and hired anthropologists, and Secretary of Defense Gates announced Project Minerva to enhance the connection between the humanities and the military.
And now this.
A United States Army Staff Sergeant, an E-6 for those of you who care, admitted to using a Qu'ran for target practice, writing "Fuck yeah" on the torn remains, and leaving it in the dust.
Luckily when an Iraqi militiaman found the Qu'ran and reported, American officers took the matter seriously, apologized publicly, and presented local clan leaders with a new copy of the Qu'ran. At the very least this shows some appreciation of the importance of acknowledging problems and dealing with them quickly and decisively to show our allies that we take their concerns seriously. With any luck, this unfortunate episode will stop here, and not lead to more violence in Iraq or provide al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups with more propaganda fodder.
There's a bigger issue at play here, though. You can't force soldiers (or any one else) to be culturally sensitive no matter how much training and experience they have, and you can't force them to respect people different than they are. However, you can provide them enough training that they understand that desecrating religious symbols will cause problems, and to at least police up after themselves when they do something stupid. What the hell was this NCO thinking? This isn't PFC or a new corporal with only a few years of experience we're talking about here. This was an act by a career NCO responsible for leading other soldiers and providing a good example for them. If we can't trust these folks to do the right thing in Iraq, how are we supposed to expect that the "strategic corporals" are going to get it?
It's all well and good that Petraeus and other senior officers preach the counterinsurgency gospel, but if the soldiers who have to do the work don't buy in to it, then it won't do any good. While this may be an isolated incident, I think it's time for some serious looks at the training and leadership of troops headed to Iraq.
Terrorism About Alienation
Posted by Chris at 9/5/2008 4:02 PM ...
My initial reaction to this WSJ article is to shrug my shoulders and ask if it really new. On reflection, for people who don't remember Marxist terrorism of the 1970's and 1980's, or for some reason dismiss the terrorist impulses of folks like Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber, this may be an epiphany. This includes political and military leaders who only really awakened to the growing issue of terrorism when al-Qaeda and other extremist groups targeted the United States using religious rhetoric as a means of recruitment.
The of terrorism is, and has always been, about power and the relationships of the individual to society. It is the response of alienated individuals who are striking out at their perceived oppressors. Whether this is a foreign government, a local regime, or a multi-national corporation depends on the milieu the individual operates in. Whether this the act of a desperate individual depends on whether the terrorist is charismatic, whether groups of other similarly alienated people are already operating in his environment, and cultural influences. I imagine that cultures placing an emphasis on the efficacy of violence for resolving disputes are more likely to turn to terrorism than to just withdraw from society.What I'm not clear on is the mechanism that makes people terrorists rather than just common criminals. Maybe its a huge assumption on my part, but it would seem that there is a fair amount of alienation from society among career criminals. I'm not talking joy-riding kids, or haphazard shoplifters here, obviously.It may well emerge that the use of religion is, or is becoming, merely a means of mobilization. Religion is for the footsoldiers, not the masterminds. At some later date we may see that religion provided the dialectical staircase to indiscriminate death and destruction. The idea, for instance, that democracy (fundamentally unclean) inculpates every citizen in its nation's policies; the idea (or ancient heresy) of takfir, whereby the jihadi pre-absolves himself of killing fellow Muslims. Interestingly and encouragingly, Ayman al Zawahiri is currently squirming about in a theological debate with the venerable cleric, Sayyid Imam al Sharif, as Al Qaeda itself is having to defend its religious legitimacy.
We can further expect international terrorism to become much more diffuse in its motivations, reflecting changes in the contemporary self ("a person's essential being"). Mr. Gray has identified a vein of what he expressively calls "anomic terrorism." This would be the carnage inspired by alienation, the self-extending despair evident in the random and serial stabbings in the cities of Japan, or the campus massacres in the U.S. — or indeed in the threats voiced by Dr. Ivins during the weeks before his death. The historian Eric Hobsbawm believes that the pandemic collapse of moral inhibition has to do with a general coarsening, the desensitization of violence brought about by the mass media (and of course the Internet). This prompts some further points.
It is Mr. Bobbitt's thesis (which Mr. Gray, incidentally, tends to pooh-pooh) that the current conflicts are epochal, having to do with a shift in the constitutions of the polities of the West. As the welfare state evolves into the market state, it abandons many of its responsibilities to its citizenry, and concentrates above all on the provision of opportunities to the individual. This, I think, has clear consequences for the self: there is simply more pressure on it. In "Mr. Sammler's Planet," which appeared at the end of that great spurt of narcissistic eccentricity known as the 1960s, Saul Bellow has his elderly hero reflect (with delightful restraint) that mass individualism is relatively new and, perhaps, "has not been a great success."
Excuse Me?
Posted by Chris at 4/21/2008 7:21 PM
Counter-insurgency operations require more intelligent, more mature, more stable troops to implement. Every misstep by the so-called "strategic corporals" lengthens the conflict and reduces the likelihood of success. So why does a force that is slowly gaining expertise in COIN operations recruit "convicted sex offenders, people convicted of making terrorist threats and child abusers"?
Keep in mind that the U.S. military in Iraq is just now rescuing its reputation from the effects of Abu Ghraib, the Haditha massacre, and excesses by private military contractors? This is a force that continues to have issues with sexual assault against its own personnel. So some idiot decides that its a good idea to bring in the folks that already have problems with violent crime into the force engaged in such sensitive operations. According to The Guardian, last year 511 recruits with felony convictions were recruited, following the 2006 total of 249.
The recruits included:
Counter-insurgency operations require more intelligent, more mature, more stable troops to implement. Every misstep by the so-called "strategic corporals" lengthens the conflict and reduces the likelihood of success. So why does a force that is slowly gaining expertise in COIN operations recruit "convicted sex offenders, people convicted of making terrorist threats and child abusers"?
Keep in mind that the U.S. military in Iraq is just now rescuing its reputation from the effects of Abu Ghraib, the Haditha massacre, and excesses by private military contractors? This is a force that continues to have issues with sexual assault against its own personnel. So some idiot decides that its a good idea to bring in the folks that already have problems with violent crime into the force engaged in such sensitive operations. According to The Guardian, last year 511 recruits with felony convictions were recruited, following the 2006 total of 249.
The recruits included:
The felons accepted into the army and marines included 87 soldiers convicted of assault or maiming, 130 convicted of non-marijuana drug offences, seven convicted of making terrorist threats, and two convicted of indecent behaviour with a child. Waivers were also granted to 500 burglars and thieves, 19 arsonists and 9 sex offendersThese individuals come from a greater pool of almost 35,000 enlisted recruits that received moral waivers in 2006. Interestingly, the Air Force and Navy are allowed to recruit people with multiple felony convictions, while the limit for the Army and Marine Corps is a single felony. I remember back in the 1980's it was harder to get into the Air Force or Navy than the Army, I guess that's no longer the case.
The Impact of Blogging on Academic Careers
Posted by Chris at 7/26/2006 7:40 PM
A lot has been written over the past year regarding the impact of blogging on the careers of academic, but the issue came to a head again recently when it appeared that Middle-East specialist Juan Cole was not hired for a position at Yale due to a campaign by political opponents who object to his opinions and analysis regarding American policy in the Middle-East. Cole has a wildly popular blog, sometimes reaching 250,000 hits per month (I'm ecstatic to get ten hits a day, but then I'm just not in the same category in terms of quality of posts, or relevance to the lives of most people). However, because his opinions do not always fit the right-wing, or even mainstream, opinion on support for Israel, he is a frequent target for attacks by a variety of sources.
Juan Cole is not the first prominent academic blogger to run into difficulties - when Daniel Drezner was denied tenure at the University of Chicago, many bloggers believed that his blogging was the reason. Drezner has found another position at Tufts University, but the episode left many academic bloggers nervous. Of course, non-tenured academic bloggers have actually been fired over their blogging - The Phantom Professor is just the most visible example.
Of course, bloggers outside academia face potentially greater consequences than not receiving a promotion or getting a different tenured position. Bloggers in the IT world have been fired for blogging, as did a worker at the CIA, who expressed her opinion over the Geneva Conventions and torture. Blogging, it seems, is not always an economically safe choice.
The recent furor over Juan Cole's non-hiring by Yale is having an additional chilling effect that some of the earlier cases did not, possibly because it is more widely publicized, or because he so public a figure. It seems likely that Bleu's decision to discontinue her blog, Smoking in the Dark, is related to this. Bleu's blog came to my attention when a link to it was posted on HNN (I think) due to her work with Templar art in France. Her blog was a combination of serious academic work, attempts to understand the nature of war, and worries over friends serving in the Middle East. I can only assume that more academics will abandon their blogs, or go underground.
I admit to having concerns along these lines. I sometimes wonder if blogging will keep me from getting into a PhD program, getting, or keeping academic jobs. I wonder if blogging could negatively impact my day job, or my part time teaching. These concerns are part of what lead me to drop my previous blog and turn to this endeavor. What I do here is probably tempting fate enough - someone could certainly read my ramblings and decide I'm not serious enough, dedicated enough, or simply not smart enough to attend (or teach at) their institution.
That people lose their jobs, promotions, or don't get new positions is a serious issue for all bloggers, academic or otherwise, to consider as they write and develop their online personalities. As more widely read people have pointed out, the First Amendment only protects us from the Federal government, not our employers. By putting out opinions out here for the world to read, we are accepting the responsibility for expressing those opinions, as well as the risk of negative consequences. It may seem unfair that people would hold what are frequently hastily formed opinions against bloggers, but it is simply human nature for that to happen in these days where employers, families, and acquaintances Google anyone and everyone. Blogging may seem to them to show undesirable traits, or make them worry that you are overly focused on bloggin, and not on work, school, or family.
So what does this mean for academic bloggers. For that, I recommend the Chronicle of Higher Education's small forum for discussing this, particularly the essays by Brad Delong and Juan Cole. I particularly found Cole's comment about being a public intellectual his career an interesting one.
A lot has been written over the past year regarding the impact of blogging on the careers of academic, but the issue came to a head again recently when it appeared that Middle-East specialist Juan Cole was not hired for a position at Yale due to a campaign by political opponents who object to his opinions and analysis regarding American policy in the Middle-East. Cole has a wildly popular blog, sometimes reaching 250,000 hits per month (I'm ecstatic to get ten hits a day, but then I'm just not in the same category in terms of quality of posts, or relevance to the lives of most people). However, because his opinions do not always fit the right-wing, or even mainstream, opinion on support for Israel, he is a frequent target for attacks by a variety of sources.
Juan Cole is not the first prominent academic blogger to run into difficulties - when Daniel Drezner was denied tenure at the University of Chicago, many bloggers believed that his blogging was the reason. Drezner has found another position at Tufts University, but the episode left many academic bloggers nervous. Of course, non-tenured academic bloggers have actually been fired over their blogging - The Phantom Professor is just the most visible example.
Of course, bloggers outside academia face potentially greater consequences than not receiving a promotion or getting a different tenured position. Bloggers in the IT world have been fired for blogging, as did a worker at the CIA, who expressed her opinion over the Geneva Conventions and torture. Blogging, it seems, is not always an economically safe choice.
The recent furor over Juan Cole's non-hiring by Yale is having an additional chilling effect that some of the earlier cases did not, possibly because it is more widely publicized, or because he so public a figure. It seems likely that Bleu's decision to discontinue her blog, Smoking in the Dark, is related to this. Bleu's blog came to my attention when a link to it was posted on HNN (I think) due to her work with Templar art in France. Her blog was a combination of serious academic work, attempts to understand the nature of war, and worries over friends serving in the Middle East. I can only assume that more academics will abandon their blogs, or go underground.
I admit to having concerns along these lines. I sometimes wonder if blogging will keep me from getting into a PhD program, getting, or keeping academic jobs. I wonder if blogging could negatively impact my day job, or my part time teaching. These concerns are part of what lead me to drop my previous blog and turn to this endeavor. What I do here is probably tempting fate enough - someone could certainly read my ramblings and decide I'm not serious enough, dedicated enough, or simply not smart enough to attend (or teach at) their institution.
That people lose their jobs, promotions, or don't get new positions is a serious issue for all bloggers, academic or otherwise, to consider as they write and develop their online personalities. As more widely read people have pointed out, the First Amendment only protects us from the Federal government, not our employers. By putting out opinions out here for the world to read, we are accepting the responsibility for expressing those opinions, as well as the risk of negative consequences. It may seem unfair that people would hold what are frequently hastily formed opinions against bloggers, but it is simply human nature for that to happen in these days where employers, families, and acquaintances Google anyone and everyone. Blogging may seem to them to show undesirable traits, or make them worry that you are overly focused on bloggin, and not on work, school, or family.
So what does this mean for academic bloggers. For that, I recommend the Chronicle of Higher Education's small forum for discussing this, particularly the essays by Brad Delong and Juan Cole. I particularly found Cole's comment about being a public intellectual his career an interesting one.
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