Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China Confidential: American
Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996
Tucker exaqmines the
complex relationship between the United States and China from the perspective
of the foreign service officers who worked in the trenches. This allows Tucker to examine the inner
workings of the American State Department, the psychology of decision makers,
and include the small details of Sino-American relations that are not captured
in speeches, treaties, or policy documents.
Tucker’s ground level focus in China Confidential sets it apart
from most other texts dealing with Sino-American relations. Only Chen Jian’s Mao’s China and the Cold
War and David Lampton’s Same Bed, Different Dreams even attempt to
examine the psychology of policy makers, and Tucker is alone in examining the
motivations of sub-cabinet officials. China
Confidential also clearly shows the economic and political development of
the Nationalist government on Taiwan, including its slow move toward the goal
of independence. However, this approach
also means that she does not address issues like the “Chinese victim complex”
or sources of the Sino-Soviet Split discussed by Chen and others.
Looking at the impact of sub-cabinet level officials on
Sino-Soviet relations, Paul Wolfowitz’s ideological biases had a negative
impact as he removed Chinese offers to hold four-party talks to reduce tensions
from memos sent back to Washington, even though senior officials like Secretary
of State George Shulz were the targets of those offers. Tucker does not focus only on the negative
impacts and opinions of lower-level American diplomats; she also illustrates
the contributions and frustrations of those trying to make Sino-Soviet
relations work. As an example of the positive efforts of American diplomats,
Ambassador Winston Lord and his Chinese wife Bette Bao Lord tried to subtly
educate Chinese officials on the need for reform in politics and on human
rights by having “philosophical discussions” with them. They also utilized Mrs. Lord’s language
skills and cultural knowledge to deal with Chinese officials and their unique
psychology. Her knowledge of China and
her academic and literary credentials also gave Winston Lord access to part of
Chinese society that he would not normally be part of as ambassador. The Lords used this to establish ties with
China’s future leaders, as well as dissidents and intellectuals.
As important as the impact, methods, and motivations of
State Department officials are, those of senior policy makers reign
supreme. This is particularly true when
assessing the relative impact on Sino-American relations of individuals like
Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Jimmy Carter. Both Nixon and Kissinger acted to keep the
State Department out of foreign policy decision making: Nixon because he did
not trust or respect the Foreign Service, and Kissinger because he wanted to
control access to the President and wanted to manage relations along his own
geopolitical lines. In Kissinger’s case,
this included ignoring human rights issues in favor of strategic concerns and
not informing key personnel of impending developments. Jimmy Carter’s desire to normalize relations
at all costs, and uncritically accepting Chinese demands in the process caused
him problem with Congress, which passed the Taiwan Relations Act to force his
Administration to maintain some ties to Taiwan over Chinese objections.
By examining the psychology and motivations of American
leaders, Tucker provides the perfect counterpoint to Chen’s discussion of the
psychological and cultural motivations of Chinese leaders. Chen attributes Chinese actions to the
“Chinese victim mentality”, and Chinese belief that China is the “Central
Kingdom”. In the “Chinese victim mentality”
theory, China’s leaders believe that Western powers have exploited and
humiliated China during the modern era, which prevents China from taking the
place on the world stage that they believe it deserves. The Chinese victim mentality feeds on the
Chinese belief that China is the “Central Kingdom”: the glorious source of
culture and civilization that other nations should want to be near or
emulate. These twin psychologies combine
in a manner that makes Chinese leaders believe that the West owes China for
past wrongs, and deal with foreign leaders in an arrogant manner. Tucker also briefly mentions the Chinese
concept of the Central or Middle Kingdom, when she quotes Lindsey Grant
describing the phenomenon that Chinese “feel themselves the center of the
earth” and that the Chinese name for China, Zhongguo, literally means “Middle
Kingdom.”
In an area of study dominated by analysis of geopolitical
strategic actions and motive, or by political science theory based explanations
of the Sino-American relationship, Tucker provides a more personal look at the
events, decisions, and actors in managing Sino-American relations. In this she provides the American side of the
equation, which balances Chen Jian’s effort to explain the Chinese
interpretation of those same events and decisions. While China Confidential does not
provide a complete explanation of all of the factors behind Sino-American
relations, it does allow a more complete understanding of the interaction
between the two nations and their leaders.
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